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ABSTRACT 
 
Finnur Dellsén: Externalist Accessibilism 
(Under the direction of Matthew Kotzen) 
 
Internalism about epistemic justification is, roughly, the view that everything that is 
relevant to an agent’s epistemic justification is internal to the agent. In this paper, I argue 
that internalism is false, and that a kind of externalism is true instead. The bulk of the 
paper consists in spelling out and defending this externalist view of epistemic 
justification – a view I call externalist accessibilism. Although this is an externalist view, 
I argue that it accommodates the main considerations in favor of internalism. Thus, 
externalist accessibilism is, in an important sense, an internalist-friendly externalism 
about justification. 
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1. Internalism about Epistemic Justification 
Internalism and externalism about epistemic justification are opposing views about what 
kinds of factors determine whether, and to what extent, a given agent is justified in 
believing some proposition. Let us call these factors justifiers.1 Internalism holds that all 
justifiers must be internal to an agent, while externalism denies that this must always be 
the case. Of course, different accounts of what it is to be ‘internal to an agent’ will give 
us different accounts of what internalism and externalism amount to – we will look into 
that shortly. But, roughly, we can now say that the internalism/externalism debate is 
about whether there are any external justifiers for our beliefs. If there are, externalism is 
true. If not, internalism is true.2 
 Before we say more about what internalism about epistemic justification amounts 
to, we should note that there are at least two different notions of epistemic justification: 
doxastic justification and propositional justification. For an agent S to be doxastically 
justified in believing a proposition p is for S’s belief that p to be justified. It is commonly 
assumed that this requires that S’s belief that p be based on the justification S has for p, 
where it is a matter of some controversy what this ‘basing-relation’ between beliefs and 
justification consists in. Propositional justification, however, does not require that one has 
any belief in accordance with one’s justification, or that such a belief, if one has it, is 
                                                
1 Note that on this definition justifiers need not contribute to an agent’s justification – justifiers 
can also undermine an agent’s justification. This distinction will be important when I discuss 
Gibbons’s argument against internalism in section 3. 
 
2 On Goldman’s (2009: 2) helpful terminology, this means that I am assuming that the terms of 
engagement in the internalism/externalism debate are existential, as opposed to majoritarian. 
 2 
based on the justification one has for that belief. Rather, to be propositionally justified in 
believing something requires only that one has some justification. The idea is that if an 
agent has (propositional) justification, then there is a belief such that if she were to have 
that belief and base it on the propositional justification she has, then she would have a 
(doxastically) justified belief. 
 If this is right, as it is commonly assumed to be, then propositional justification is 
necessary but not sufficient for doxastic justification. This opens up the logical space of 
internalism about propositional justification combined with externalism about doxastic 
justification. More importantly for our purposes, it rules out externalism about 
propositional justification combined with internalism about doxastic justification, as the 
following argument shows: If some external factors are relevant to propositional 
justification, and if propositional justification is necessary for doxastic justification, then 
those very same external factors are also relevant to doxastic justification. So, on the 
assumption that propositional justification is necessary for doxastic justification, 
externalism about propositional justification entails externalism about doxastic 
justification. 
 Now, unfortunately, few participants in the internalism/externalism debate are 
careful to distinguish between doxastic and propositional justification. But if we accept 
the common view that propositional justification is necessary for doxastic justification, 
then we can avoid the interpretative issue of whether particular internalists intend for 
their view to be about propositional justification or doxastic justification. We can just 
assume, rightly or wrongly, that they intend their view to be the weaker view of 
internalism about propositional justification. If that view is false, then so is the stronger 
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view of internalism about doxastic justification. I will adopt that strategy in this paper. I 
shall be arguing that internalism about propositional justification is false, and that a kind 
of externalism is true instead. On the common assumption that propositional justification 
is necessary for doxastic justification, this entails that internalism about doxastic 
justification is false as well, and so that some form of externalism is true instead.3 
 If, however, the common view about the relationship between propositional and 
doxastic justification is false, then matters are of course not so straightforward. However, 
even in that case, I do not think that any current internalist would happily accept 
externalism about propositional justification and maintain it only about doxastic 
justification. Indeed, the most straightforward way of interpreting internalists is as 
arguing for internalism about both propositional and doxastic justification, irrespective of 
how the two theses are related.4 So it would still be important to argue, as I will, that 
internalism about propositional justification is false and that a kind of externalism is true 
instead. For what it’s worth, however, I do agree with the common view that 
propositional justification is necessary for doxastic justification,5 and so I do think that to 
argue against the former is ipso facto to argue against the latter. For these partly 
dialectical reasons, I shall from now on be concerned only with propositional justification 
and interpret internalists accordingly. 
So internalism is concerned, primarily or at least in part, with propositional 
justification. But what does internalism amount to? As Feldman and Conee (2001: 2) 
                                                
3 Of course, the externalism about propositional justification need not be the same as that about 
doxastic justification. 
 
4 This would explain why internalists generally don’t distinguish between the two theses. 
 
5 Unfortunately, I cannot argue for that view here, since doing so would take us too far away from 
the main topic of this paper. 
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point out, there are at least two “distinct but closely related” versions of internalism in the 
recent literature. On Feldman and Conee’s preferred version, mentalism, epistemic 
justification is determined by things internal to an agent’s mind. More precisely, Feldman 
and Conee see mentalism as being committed to two related theses. First: 
S. The justificatory status of a person’s doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes on the 
person’s occurrent and dispositional mental states, events, and conditions. (2001: 2) 
 
This implies the following more concrete thesis: 
M. If any two possible individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are exactly 
alike justificationally, e.g. the same beliefs are justified for them to the same extent. 
(2001: 2) 
 
Using the terminology from the beginning of this section, we can say that mentalism 
holds that all justifiers are “occurrent and dispositional mental states, events and 
conditions”, or, for brevity, that all justifiers are mental states. 
On the other version of internalism, accessibilism, epistemic justification is 
determined by factors to which the agent has some special sort of access. This special sort 
of access is usually, if not always, understood to be a kind of cognitive access (see, e.g., 
BonJour (2002)), or access by reflection alone (see, e.g., Audi (2003) and Pryor (2001)). I 
will refer to this special sort of access, whatever it is, as internal access. So, simply put, 
accessibilism holds that an agent has internal access to all of her justifiers, i.e. that the 
factors which determine whether, and to what extent, an agent is justified in believing 
something are all internally accessible. As Pryor (2001) points out, an accessibilist need 
not hold that the agent has internal access to her justificatory status, only that the factors 
which determine the agent’s justificatory status are all internally accessible. So, 
accessibilism does not by itself require that one be able to tell whether one is justified in 
order to be justified. That would be a further commitment that accessibilists could take 
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on, thereby committing to a stronger version of accessibilism.6 I shall not here be 
concerned at all with this stronger version of accessibilism. 
A brief note is in order on the relationship between mentalism and accessibilism. 
Given that internal access is either some sort of cognitive access or access by reflection 
alone, it might seem reasonable to assume that an agent has internal access only to (all or 
some of) her mental states. In that case, all internally accessible factors would be mental 
states, so the claim that all justifiers are internally accessible would entail the claim that 
all justifiers are mental states. In other words, accessibilism would entail mentalism. 
However, it is not so clear that all internally accessible factors are mental states of any 
kind. As BonJour (2002) points out, it seems that one can have internal access to some a 
priori truths which are quite obviously not part of one’s mental states, nor do they 
supervene on one’s mental states. BonJour’s idea is that, since a priori truths can be 
discovered by reflection alone, one need not even have any beliefs about such truths in 
order for them to be internally accessible in the relevant sense. If BonJour is right about 
that, then accessibilism does not entail mentalism.7 
 
2. Arguments for Internalism 
                                                
6 Pryor calls accessibilism “simple internalism”, and the stronger version of accessibilism “access 
internalism”. (2001: 104-105) 
 
7 To further complicate things, however, this only shows that accessibilism does not entail S. 
BonJour’s point is compatible with accessibilism entailing M, since if two agents are in exactly 
the same mental states then they would presumably have internal access to exactly the same a 
priori truths. So, if mentalists respond by weakening their theory to only M, then the entailment 
of mentalism from accessibilism could perhaps still be maintained. The natural worry to have 
here is that M is not by itself a particularly interesting thesis to hold – it is certainly not Feldman 
and Conee’s view. Since I know of no one who holds only M, I shall not be concerned with that 
view in what follows. 
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Let me now briefly review what I take to be the most convincing arguments for 
internalism. The point of this is not only to show that internalism is a prima facie 
plausible view– and so a view whose refutation is interesting and noteworthy. The main 
point is rather to provide a background against which I will propose a rival to internalism: 
I will argue, in section 6, that none of the arguments reviewed in this section are sound as 
they stand, and so that what I take to be the most convincing arguments for internalism 
fail. However, I shall also argue that these arguments can all be slightly modified so as to 
be sound. But the modified and sound arguments, unfortunately for the internalist, do not 
support internalism at all. Rather, they support the kind of externalism that I am 
proposing in this paper. 
 I will be discussing three arguments, although the last two are similar enough to 
perhaps count as versions of each other (more on that below). In discussing each 
argument, I first characterize the relevant argument as an argument for internalism in 
general and then discuss whether it is, or is most straightforwardly seen as, an argument 
for accessibilism or for mentalism.8 
 
2.1. The Best Explanation Argument 
First, and most straightforwardly, Feldman and Conee (2001) have argued that 
internalism is the best explanation for various cases where two agents in similar 
situations are not equally justified in believing something. In all such cases, Feldman and 
Conee argue, there is also an internal difference between the two agents. If so, then it is 
reasonable to infer – by something like an inference to the best explanation – that 
                                                
8 This strategy requires me to slightly mischaracterize Feldman and Conee’s view, e.g. by talking 
about ‘internal states’ where they would say ‘mental states’. 
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differences in agents’ justificatory statuses are determined by differences in their internal 
states. 
Space does not permit us to look at all of Feldman and Conee’s cases, but it will 
be useful in what follows to look at one: 
Bob and Ray are sitting in an air-conditioned hotel lobby reading yesterday’s 
newspaper. Each has read that it will be very warm today and, on that basis, each 
believes that it is very warm today. Then Bob goes outside and feels the heat. They 
both continue to believe that it is very warm today. But at this point Bob’s belief is 
better justified. (2001: 3) 
 
The idea is that when sitting in the hotel lobby, Bob and Ray were equally justified in 
believing that it is very warm today. Internalism explains this because, at that point, Bob 
and Ray’s internal states were the same.9 However, when Bob went outside, his belief 
became more justified. Again, internalism provides an explanation: Feeling the heat, Bob 
underwent an internal change. Ray, of course, went through no such internal change. The 
difference in Bob and Ray’s internal states thus explains the difference in their 
justificatory statuses. Let us call this the best explanation argument. 
Feldman and Conee intend for this argument to support mentalism. Whether this 
is an argument only for mentalism, or also an argument for accessibilism, depends on 
whether there are any cases of agents which differ only with respect to non-accessible 
mental states but that are intuitively still not equally justified in believing something. A 
test case might be something along the lines of a memory that needs some external 
stimuli in order to be recalled, and so cannot be internally accessed, while still being one 
of the agent’s mental states. If our intuitive judgment is that an agent that has such an 
internally non-accessible memory is more justified than an otherwise identical agent that 
                                                
9 More precisely, those internal states that are relevant to Bob and Ray’s justification for 
believing that it is very warm outside were the same. 
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does not, then a best explanation argument supports only mentalism and not also 
accessibilism. I shall not here speculate about whether there are any such cases – I only 
want to highlight the fact that accessibilism would have to deny the existence of such 
cases, or at least somehow explain them away. 
Note also that the best explanation argument will hardly constitute a decisive case 
for internalism. The main reason for this is simply that according to internalism, all 
differences in justificatory statuses are due to internal differences. But one couldn’t 
possibly hope to go through an exhaustive list of all kinds of differences in justificatory 
statuses, showing that each one is due to a kind of internal difference. So, a best 
explanation argument can, at best, only conclusively show that internal differences do 
make a difference to justification, not that all differences in justificatory statuses are due 
to differences in internal states. Indeed, I shall argue below that although it is true that 
internal differences make a difference to justification, external differences can make a 
difference as well. 
 
2.2. The Argument from Possession 
Let us move on to a second argument for internalism. According to this argument, 
justification is a matter of having reasons for (and against) believing something, and one 
cannot have reasons for (or against) believing something unless those reasons are internal 
to the agent. It follows then that anything relevant to an agent’s justification must be 
internal to that agent. I will call this the argument from possession.10 More precisely, the 
argument is this: 
                                                
10 Something very similar to this argument is presented by BonJour, who takes it to be “the 
central rationale for internalism”. (2002: 237) 
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(1) S’s justificatory status with regard to some proposition p is fully determined by 
the reasons S has for (and against) believing that p. 
(2) Any reason S has for (or against) believing something must be internal to S. 
(3) Therefore, S’s justificatory status is fully determined by factors internal to S. 
[Follows from (1) and (2).] 
Even this is not as precise as it could be. For ‘factors internal to S’ is ambiguous between 
a mentalist and an accessibilist account of what it is for something to be internal: We can 
either understand ‘factors internal to S’ to be S’s mental states, or, alternatively, factors 
internally accessible to S. Depending on how we resolve this ambiguity, the argument 
from possession will either be an argument for mentalism or an argument for 
accessibilism. 
 Let me try to convince you that the argument from possession is most plausible 
when interpreted as an argument for accessibilism.11 On an accessibilist interpretation of 
the argument, (2) says that any reason S has for (or against) believing p must be 
internally accessible to S. This is quite plausible, prima facie, for it seems that part of 
what it is to have a reason is for that reason to be somehow accessible. This is not to deny 
that there could be reasons for S to believe p which are not accessible to S, e.g. reasons S 
does not know about. The claim here is only that those reasons wouldn’t be among the 
reasons S has for (or against) believing p – in other words, they wouldn’t be S’s reasons. I 
conclude that, on an accessibilist interpretation of the argument, (2) is quite plausible. 
And so the argument as a whole seems to support accessibilism. 
Does the argument from possession also plausibly support mentalism? Well, on 
the assumption that all internally accessible factors are mental states, and so that 
                                                
11 As a matter of fact, BonJour (2002) is an accessibilist. 
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accessibilism entails mentalism, the argument from possession would be an indirect 
argument for mentalism in the sense that an argument for a stronger thesis is always also 
indirectly an argument for a weaker version of that thesis. As we have seen, however, 
there is good reason to think that accessibilism does not entail mentalism because a priori 
truths seem to be internally accessible even though they are not part of the agent’s mental 
states. But is there perhaps a version of the argument from possession which directly 
supports mentalism? In other words, is there an argument from possession which 
supports mentalism even if accessibilism doesn’t entail mentalism? This depends on 
whether a mentalist interpretation of (2) is plausible even if there are internally accessible 
factors that don’t supervene on S’s mental states. I don’t really want to take a stand on 
that issue here. But it does seem like the mentalist would struggle to explain why an 
internally accessible factor, even if it doesn’t supervene on S’s mental states, couldn’t be 
a reason S has for believing something. Consider again a priori truths. Could such truths 
be among S’s reasons for believing something? If the answer is ‘yes’, as it seems to me, 
then it seems that the argument from possession wouldn’t support mentalism. 
 To conclude, the argument from possession seems most straightforwardly to be 
seen as an argument for accessibilism. Nothing of what I will go on to argue turns on this, 
but it’s worth noting that just as accessibilism would struggle with accommodating the 
best explanation argument for internalism, mentalism would struggle with 
accommodating the argument from possession. If that’s right, then we should perhaps 
start looking for an alternative theory – one that manages to accommodate both 
arguments without running into these problems. I shall propose such a theory in section 5. 
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2.3. The Argument from Belief-Regulation 
There is another argument for internalism, closely related to the argument we just 
examined. As I see this argument, it starts out with a certain idea about the nature of 
justification. The idea is that for something to be relevant to an agent’s justificatory status 
it must enable the agent to adjust her beliefs in accordance with some epistemic norm that 
the agent has. Therefore, anything that does not enable an agent to adjust her beliefs in 
this way must be irrelevant to that agent’s justificatory status. But, this argument 
continues, only internal factors could be used by an agent to adjust her beliefs in this way. 
It follows that only internal factors are relevant to justification. I will call this the 
argument from belief-regulation.12 More precisely, the argument is this: 
(1) S’s justificatory status is fully determined by factors that enable S to adjust her 
beliefs in accordance with her epistemic norms, i.e. by factors that enable S to 
regulate her beliefs. 
(2) Only factors internal to S could enable S to regulate her beliefs.13 
(3) Therefore, S’s justificatory status is fully determined by factors internal to S. 
[Follows from (1) and (2).] 
Although the sense of ‘regulation’ in the argument is a kind of self-regulation, viz. 
adjusting one’s beliefs in accordance with one’s epistemic norms, it need not be a 
conscious activity in any robust sense. For example, a computer seems perfectly capable 
                                                
12 Something like this argument can be found in Pollock and Cruz (1999, chapter 5). A similar 
argument is presented by Wedgewood (2002). 
 
13 The modality of ‘could’ in (2) seems to be physical or nomological modality: If a factor F only 
regulates S’s beliefs in physically impossible worlds, then F does seem clearly irrelevant to S's  
justification. However, as far as I can see, nothing in what follows depends on this being the 
operative modality here, so if you prefer to think of the modality in question as metaphysical 
modality, then I wouldn’t mind at all. 
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of the kind of self-regulation we’re considering here – it too can adjust its states so as to 
comply with its epistemic norms, e.g. the norm of maintaining consistency. However, the 
sense of ‘regulation’ in question is not mere causation. Something that merely causes S to 
believe something would not regulate S’s beliefs because it would not enable S to adjust 
her beliefs in accordance with any of her epistemic norms. For example, an evil demon 
that causes an agent to believe false propositions wouldn’t count as regulating the agent’s 
beliefs in the relevant sense, since the beliefs caused by the evil demon are not beliefs 
formed or changed by the agent in accordance with one of her epistemic norms. 
 What should we say about the plausibility of the argument from belief-regulation? 
Well, many externalists about justification would challenge (1). However, I don’t want to 
get too involved with that challenge here, since my aim in this paper is not to defend the 
argument from belief-regulation (or any other argument for internalism). My aim is rather 
to show that this argument, with necessary modifications, does not in fact support any 
kind of internalism at all. More precisely, I will be arguing, first, that (1) cannot be used 
to construct a sound argument for internalism, and second, that (1) can be used to 
construct an argument for an opposing view. However, arguing for these two claims must 
wait until section 6, at which point I will have presented the opposing view in question. 
So, for now, let us turn to examining (2), the argument’s other premise. 
Just as the argument from possession had two different readings, the argument 
from belief-regulation is ambiguous as well: We can either understand ‘factors internal to 
S’ in (2) to be S’s mental states, or, alternatively, factors internally accessible to S. 
Again, depending on how we resolve this ambiguity, the argument from belief-regulation 
will either be an argument for mentalism or an argument for accessibilism. It seems to me 
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that both versions of the argument are problematic for different reasons. To see why, let 
us go through them in turn. 
On a mentalist interpretation, (2) says that only S’s mental states could enable S 
to regulate her beliefs. That seems plausible at first sight, for the regulation of S’s beliefs 
seems to have to take place inside S’s mind. But again we might worry, much like 
BonJour did about the argument from possession, that some factors which are clearly not 
S’s mental states, e.g. a priori truths, could also regulate S’s beliefs. For example, the 
fact that certain logical relationships hold between propositions could, perhaps, enable S 
to adjust her beliefs in accordance with the epistemic norm according to which one 
should never believe inconsistent propositions. If a priori truths could enable agents to 
regulate their beliefs in this way, then the argument is at least problematic as an argument 
for mentalism. 
What about an accessibilist interpretation of the argument? On an accessibilist 
interpretation, (2) says that only internally accessible factors could regulate S’s beliefs. 
That also seems pretty plausible at first blush, for the regulation of S’s beliefs seems to 
have to be done by factors which S can access by her cognitive faculties. However, this 
might be too quick. For it seems that some factors could enable S to regulate her beliefs 
even if they are not internally accessible, provided that those factors are internal to S’s 
mind. Consider, for example, some suppressed memories which unconsciously cause 
someone to shy away from certain beliefs while accepting others. Perhaps such 
suppressed memories can enable an agent to adjust her beliefs in accordance with her 
epistemic norms, even if such suppressed memories cannot ever be internally accessed. 
The plausibility of this seems to depend on whether the relevant sense of ‘belief-
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regulation’ allows for non-conscious belief-regulation. Since it seems to me that it 
should, it also seems to me that an accessibilist interpretation of the argument is 
problematic. 
If these admittedly speculative thoughts are along the right lines, then both 
interpretations of the argument from belief-regulation are problematic. I don’t claim to 
have identified any devastating objections to the argument on either interpretation, but I 
do think it is worth pointing out that both kinds of internalists would struggle to convince 
us that the argument from belief-regulation actually supports their respective positions. 
That should push us into thinking that perhaps the argument from belief-regulation 
should not be seen as an argument for either kind of internalism at all. Indeed, I will 
argue below that the argument must be modified slightly so as to support a different view 
altogether. 
 Now, the argument from belief-regulation is clearly a close cousin of the 
argument from possession. But I do not think that they are one and the same. For one 
might reject that there is any essential connection between justification and belief-
regulation and still accept that justification is entirely a matter of having reasons for (or 
against) believing something. One answer to the question of why having reasons is 
essential for justification is that having reasons enables one to regulate what one believes 
in light of those reasons. But this is not the only answer, for one might take it as primitive 
that having reasons is essential for justification, and view it as an accidental fact that in 
all or most cases this enables one to regulate one’s beliefs. In that case, there could be 
factors relevant to whether one has reasons for one’s beliefs which don’t enable one to 
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regulate one’s beliefs. This shows that the two arguments, although clearly closely 
related, are not identical. 
 
Let us take stock. The best explanation argument seemed to support mentalism, but to be 
problematic as an argument for accessibilism. Conversely, the argument from possession 
seemed to support accessibilism, but to be problematic as an argument for mentalism. 
Finally, the argument from belief-regulation seemed problematic on both readings. 
Although this peculiar situation does not constitute a decisive objection to either version 
of internalism, of course, it should make us suspect that these arguments are best viewed 
as considerations in favor not of either kind of internalism, but of a different view 
altogether. We shall see that this suspicion is correct in section 6, where I will argue that 
none of the above arguments are sound as they stand, on any interpretation, and so that 
none of them really supports any internalist view at all. First, however, we will look at 
some objections to internalism which aim to show not that the arguments for internalism 
fail, but that the position itself is false. That is the subject, in different ways, of the next 
two sections. 
 
3. Gibbons’s Access Externalism 
I will soon be giving an argument against internalism. First, however, I must 
acknowledge that there is already an intriguing argument against internalism in the 
literature. Gibbons (2006) present the following thought experiment: 
The other morning, I went downstairs to make a mushroom, jalapeno, and cream 
cheese omelette. I had checked the night before to make sure we had all of the 
ingredients. Since Sunny rarely eats breakfast, it was reasonable for me to believe that 
the ingredients were still there. I went to the refrigerator and pulled out the eggs and 
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mushrooms. While chopping, I firmly believed that I would soon have a mushroom, 
jalapeno, and cream cheese omelette. Unfortunately, in plain sight on the door of the 
refrigerator, there was a note. ‘We’re out of cream cheese.’ I didn’t notice the note, but 
I should have. After all, this is where we leave notes of this sort in our house. I thought 
I was having cream cheese for breakfast, but I should have known better. If I should 
have known that not-p, then I’m not justified in believing that p. (2006: 22) 
 
Gibbons contrasts the case with one in which everything is the same, except that there is 
no note on the door and no cream cheese in the refrigerator. In the second case, Gibbons 
claims that he would be justified in believing that he will be having cream cheese for 
breakfast. Since the only relevant difference between the two cases is the existence of the 
note, and since the note is clearly not internal to Gibbons in the relevant sense, Gibbons 
concludes that internalism is false. 
 I don’t think this is a convincing argument against internalism. To see why, let me 
first make a number of points about Gibbons’s cases. First, as Moon (2010) points out, if 
Gibbons is aware of the note in the first case but not the second, then there is an internal 
difference, in which case the argument wouldn’t go through. So we must assume that 
Gibbons isn’t aware of the note at all. Second, note that Gibbons does have internal 
access to something that somewhat undermines his justification, viz. the belief that when 
they are out of cream cheese someone will stick a note on the refrigerator, combined with 
the belief that he hasn’t noticed whether there is a note on the refrigerator.14 But this must 
be true of both cases, so it cannot be what is supposed to be undermining Gibbons’s 
justification in the first case but not in the second. Third, internalists can also grant that 
Gibbons had an epistemic duty to ‘keep his eyes open’ such that he would notice a note 
on the refrigerator if there is one – especially since that’s where Gibbons’s family usually 
                                                
14 These beliefs will presumably be dispositional, as opposed to occurrent, beliefs. 
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leave notes of that sort. What internalists cannot also grant is that there are any cases in 
which: 
(a) failing to do one’s epistemic duty undermines one’s justificatory status, and 
(b) whether or not one has done one’s epistemic duty depends (at least in part) on 
purely external facts, even if we fix all the internal facts.15 
Gibbons’s thought experiment is essentially a case of which (a) and (b) are both supposed 
to be true: In the first case, Gibbons had an epistemic duty in virtue of there being a note 
on his refrigerator door. Since Gibbons failed to act in accordance with this duty, his 
justification is undermined. In the second case, there was no such epistemic duty, because 
there was no note on the door. Hence Gibbons’s justification is not undermined. 
 On behalf of the internalist, I will provide three different kinds of responses to 
Gibbons’s objection. The first response is to challenge the intuition itself. The second 
response is to provide alternative explanations for the intuition – I will provide two. The 
third response is to concede that Gibbons has shown that external factors can be relevant 
to justification, but argue that the core of the internalist position can still be maintained. I 
think all of these responses work, and that should leave us unimpressed by Gibbons’s 
objection. 
Let us start with challenging the intuition. There are two ways of doing that. First, 
one could maintain that Gibbons is justified in the first case, i.e. when there is a note on 
the refrigerator. Since it seems undeniable that failing to do one’s epistemic duty 
undermines one’s justificatory status, one would then have to deny that Gibbons really 
had an epistemic duty which he failed to do. This would be a plausible way of 
                                                
15 Interestingly, at least two internalists, Greco (1990) and Steup (1999), provide theoretical 
reasons against accepting anything like (b). I will not explore that way of responding to Gibbons 
here, since it would take us too far away from the main issue. 
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challenging the intuition were it not for the fact that Gibbons sets up the case such that 
the refrigerator door “is where we leave notes of this sort in our house.” (2006: 22) It 
seems clear from this set-up that Gibbons did have an epistemic duty to act in such a way 
that he would have noticed the note. Since he didn’t, he wasn’t justified. 
This, however, sheds light on the second way of challenging the intuition. Is 
Gibbons really justified in believing that he will be having cream cheese for breakfast in 
the second case, i.e. when there is no note on the refrigerator? After all, Gibbons is by 
stipulation not at all aware of the fact that there is no note on the refrigerator – for all he 
is aware of, there could very well be such a note. Moreover, since Gibbons is exactly 
alike internally in the second case as in the first, he would not have noticed a note on the 
refrigerator had there been one – he was not, in this sense, ‘keeping his eyes open’ for a 
note on the refrigerator. But since that’s where such a note would be if he is out of cream 
cheese, Gibbons does seem to be failing to do an epistemic duty by acting in such a way 
that he is insensitive to whether there is a note on the refrigerator. So, if failing to do 
one’s epistemic duty undermines justification, as we must be assuming, the fact that 
Gibbons failed to ‘keep his eyes open’ for a note undermines his justification. That sits 
well with my intuition about the case, and I suspect that’s true of you too. If that’s the 
intuition we do in fact have, then Gibbons is not justified in either of his two cases. Our 
intuitions would thus fail to support the conclusion that an agent’s justificatory status 
depends in part on purely external facts, and so Gibbons’s cases would fail to constitute a 
counterexample to internalism.16 
                                                
16 Although I am following Gibbons in using the binary states of being justified and not being 
justified here, the same objection could be made if Gibbons were to alter his argument so as to 
recognize degrees of justification. In both of the two cases, Gibbons failed to act in such a way 
that he is sensitive to whether there is a note on his refrigerator door. This undermines Gibbons’s 
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Let us suppose that you still have the intuition that Gibbons is not justified in the 
first case but that he is justified in the second. Is the best explanation of you having that 
intuition about Gibbons’s cases that the note really undermines Gibbons’s justificatory 
status? There are at least two good reasons to think not. First, and most obviously, I 
suspect that our intuition about Gibbons’s cases is heavily influenced by us assuming 
(reasonably enough) that Gibbons is aware of the note in the first case but not the second 
– or some such fact that creates an internal epistemic duty for Gibbons to check whether 
he will be having cream cheese for breakfast. I simply think that it is hard to imagine that 
Gibbons would not be at least aware – perhaps subconsciously – of the note, while still 
having opened the refrigerator. This becomes even harder to imagine, of course, when 
Gibbons tries to bolster our intuition by making the note on the refrigerator door larger 
and larger to the point of the note being billboard-sized. (2006: 23) Let’s call the 
assumption that Gibbons is aware of the note in the first case the awareness assumption. 
My claim is that the awareness assumption influences our intuition about the case so as to 
make it an unreliable guide to whether external factors are relevant to justification. 
To support this claim, here is a test for whether the awareness assumption is 
influencing our intuitions. Suppose that in a third case everything is exactly as in 
Gibbons’s first case, except now the note is not on the refrigerator door, but rather inside 
a kitchen closet. Suppose, to make the cases relevantly similar, that these kinds of notes 
are normally kept in this kitchen closet and not on the refrigerator door. In this third case, 
there is no obvious way in which one would be aware of the note, so the awareness 
assumption doesn’t play any role in the case. The question now is: Do you still have the 
                                                                                                                                            
justification equally in both cases, and so Gibbons’s degree of justification would be the same in 
both cases. 
 20 
intuition that Gibbons isn’t justified, as you did in the first case above? If not, then you 
might start to suspect that what made the difference between the first and second case 
was that you assumed that Gibbons was aware of the note in the first case but not the 
second. After all, the only relevant difference between the first and the third case seems 
to be that it is reasonable for us to assume that Gibbons was aware of the note in the first 
case but not in the third. But if we are assuming, in the first case, that Gibbons is aware of 
the note, then Gibbons wouldn’t have shown that what makes the justificatory difference 
between Gibbons’s two original cases is the external difference rather than the assumed 
internal difference between awareness and non-awareness of the note. So the awareness 
assumption would be an alternative explanation for our alleged intuition about Gibbons’s 
cases. 
A second alternative explanation concerns the distinction between justification 
and warrant. Consider a hard-headed internalist who, contra Gibbons, thinks that 
Gibbons is justified in believing that he will be having cream cheese for breakfast in the 
first case. This internalist would still have to admit that there is something undesirable 
about Gibbons’s epistemic status. It’s not just that his belief is false. Indeed, let’s imagine 
that there is cream cheese in the refrigerator but that the note says differently. In that 
case, the hard-headed internalist we are considering would have to say that Gibbons has a 
justified true belief. But would she say that this justified true belief is knowledge? She 
might not. She might contend rather that this is a Gettier case, i.e. that the case is one in 
which the agent is missing the fourth condition for knowledge, whatever that is. This is 
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just to say that Gibbons would be justified but not warranted, where warrant is 
understood to be whatever it is that turns a true belief into knowledge.17 
Now, why would the hard-headed internalist think that Gibbons is justified but 
not warranted in the first case? Well, if Gibbons had only happened to notice the note, as 
he presumably would normally do, then his justification would be undermined. He didn’t, 
of course. But it’s reasonable to suppose that just as beliefs that are accidentally true are 
not warranted, beliefs whose justifications are accidentally not undermined are not 
warranted either – where ‘accidentally not undermined’ justification is, roughly, 
justification for which it is a mere coincidence that it hasn’t been undermined.18 For 
example, if the computer screen I am now looking at turns black every time I blink my 
eyes, then I’m not warranted, although I might be justified, in believing that the computer 
screen is functioning properly. This seems to be because it was a mere coincidence that I 
didn’t see the black screen, i.e. because my justification was only accidentally not 
undermined. Similarly, it was a mere coincidence that Gibbons didn’t notice the note on 
his refrigerator door when he went into the kitchen (if it wasn’t then Gibbons surely isn’t 
justified in either case). Therefore, Gibbons’s justification for the belief that he will be 
having cream cheese for breakfast was accidentally not undermined, in the sense spelled 
out above. And so, since it is plausible that a belief’s justification being accidentally not 
undermined is incompatible with the belief being warranted, it is plausible that Gibbons 
                                                
17 The term is of course due to Plantinga (1993). 
 
18 Reed (2000) argues that any accidentality of justification is incompatible with warrant. That 
seems too strong to me, for the mere fact that it’s an accident that one is justified in believing 
something doesn’t seem to destroy knowledge. (It can be an accident that I happened to go into 
this particular room, and so be an accident that I am justified in believing things about the insides 
of the room. But, presumably, I can still know things about the insides or the room, and so I can 
still be warranted in those beliefs.) Hence my suggestion here is only that a belief’s justification 
being accidentally not undermined is incompatible with that belief being warranted. 
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isn’t warranted. But, the hard-headed internalist could maintain, Gibbons would still be 
justified, albeit accidentally so. 
Now, internalists could naturally object that cases like this – where the agent 
would not be warranted even if she were justified – are not the most reliable cases to base 
our theory of justification upon. More precisely, internalists could object that the fact that 
Gibbons is not warranted might (mistakenly) be leading us into thinking that he is not 
justified either. Once we have separated the notion of justification from that of warrant, 
they might argue, there is little reason to think that Gibbons has shown anything about 
justification as opposed to warrant. So the alternative explanation here is that our 
intuition about Gibbons’s cases is not due to differences in justification in the two cases, 
but rather to differences in warrant. That’s the second alternative explanation for the 
intuition that Gibbons thinks we have about his two cases. Of course, this second 
explanation does not rule out the first explanation, nor does the first rule out the second, 
so these alternative explanations could be complimentary explanations for our alleged 
intuition. 
Suppose you still think that the conjunction of (a) and (b) is the best explanation 
for our alleged intuition that Gibbons is justified in the second case but not the first, and 
suppose that we really do have that intuition. What would that show? Not quite as much 
as one might think. What it shows is at most that external facts can undermine 
justification. By contrast, Gibbons presents no case in which purely external facts 
contribute to justification. Now, there are many cases in which something undermines 
justification by contributing to the justification for some other belief. For example, 
Gibbons’s justification for believing that he will be having cream cheese for breakfast 
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would be undermined by him being told that the refrigerator is completely empty. In that 
case, Gibbons is justified, at least to some extent, in believing that there is nothing in the 
refrigerator. So, in that case, there is something that he is justified in believing, and the 
very same thing that makes him so justified undermines his justification for believing 
something else, viz. that he will be having cream cheese for breakfast. The same doesn’t 
seem to be true of the external fact that supposedly undermines Gibbons’s justification. 
The mere presence of the note on Gibbons’s refrigerator hardly makes him justified in 
believing anything. Note that it’s not just that the presence of the note doesn’t at all 
justify him in believing that he will not be having cream cheese. Rather, the presence of 
the note doesn’t justify him in believing anything at all. More colloquially, we can say 
that the presence of the note is, at most, only destructive to Gibbons’s justificatory status. 
Let us call factors which undermine justification, but which cannot ever by 
themselves contribute to our justification for believing anything, mere justification-
underminers. And let us call factors which can by themselves justify us in believing 
something justification-conferrers. On this terminology, we can say that Gibbons’s 
objection at most shows that some mere justification-underminers are external, as 
opposed to showing that any justification-conferrers are external. If that’s all Gibbons has 
shown, then internalists could still be at least half-right: They could be right about which 
kinds of factors can contribute to justification. Accordingly, internalists could respond to 
Gibbons’s argument by modifying their view so that it applies only to justification-
conferrers, not also to mere justification-underminers. This would not be a completely ad 
hoc position to take, for there does seem to be an epistemically relevant difference 
between justification-conferrers and mere justification-underminers. Besides, even 
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externalists tend to include internalist no-defeater clauses in their theories of 
justification.19 So perhaps internalists could analogously include externalist no-defeater 
clauses in their internalist theories without being legitimately accused of changing the 
rules of the game.20 
 Of course, this more modest version of internalism is not Gibbons’s position. 
According to Gibbons, justification supervenes on what one is in a position to know, 
including the external facts one is in a position to know. Now, even though Gibbons has 
at most only shown that mere justification-underminers can be external, not also that 
justification-conferrers can be external, this would still be a legitimate conclusion to 
draw. For if Gibbons is right about mere justification-underminers, then he’s also right 
about the supervenience base of justification more generally. So Gibbons’s position 
wouldn’t be wrong. But it would be uninformative as it stands, since it wouldn’t tell us 
whether justification-conferrers can be external as well. So if we are serious about finding 
out what kinds of factors are relevant to justification, then Gibbons’s view cannot be the 
whole story for us. Again, let me emphasize that this isn’t arguing that Gibbons is wrong, 
only that his position cannot be the most informative story there is of what kinds of 
factors determine whether, and to what extent, an agent is justified in believing 
something. 
                                                
19 See Bergmann (1997) for an overview. 
 
20 Interestingly, at least two authors seem to characterize internalism as something very much like 
this position. First, Alston characterizes his ‘perspectival internalism’ in terms of conferring 
justification: “[…] in order to confer justification something must be within the subject’s 
‘perspective’ or ‘viewpoint’ on the world, in the sense of being something that the subject knows, 
believes, or justifiably believes.” (1986: 186) Second, Comesaña characterizes mentalism as 
being about “the factors that contribute to the epistemic justification of a doxastic attitude 
towards a proposition”. (2005: 59 – my emphasis) 
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Of course, we might still ask ourselves whether we accept Gibbons’s account of 
mere justification-underminers. I’m inclined not to, for the reasons given above. But we 
are now in a position to see that this issue is somewhat orthogonal to my task in this 
paper. I’ll be arguing for a theory of justifiers generally, not only of mere justification-
underminers. If you’re already convinced of externalism because of Gibbons’s arguments 
for there being external mere justification-underminers, then you’ll find my theory to be a 
more informative (and hopefully convincing) theory of justifiers more generally. If not, 
then I think my arguments should convince you of externalism once and for all, and for 
entirely different reasons than Gibbons has already given you. Either way, part of my task 
will be to convince you of something Gibbons hasn’t even addressed, viz. that 
justification-conferrers can be external. As a consequence, my view is a rival not only to 
the internalist views discussed in section 1, but also to the modest internalism, outlined 
above, which holds only that all justification-conferrers are internal. 
To sum up, I have registered some doubts about Gibbons’s objection to 
internalism and the significance of that objection for the internalism-externalism debate. 
However, at the end of the day, Gibbons and I are allies in a very important respect. We 
both reject the internalist assumption that the epistemic property of being relevant to 
someone’s justificatory status could be restricted by non-epistemic distinctions such as 
what is and what isn’t part of one’s mental states, or what can and what cannot be 
accessed by one’s cognitive powers or by reflection alone. But although we are allies in 
this respect, we still disagree about why these distinctions are irrelevant. Having rejected 
Gibbons’s argument for thinking them irrelevant in this section, I now turn to giving my 
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own argument for the irrelevance of such distinctions to the issue of what determines an 
agent’s justificatory status. 
 
4. Against Internalism 
Here’s the plan for this section: I start by discussing a very general challenge to 
internalism. Then, based on that general challenge, I formulate a specific problem case 
for internalism. This case shows that internalism cannot give an adequate response to the 
general challenge, and so that internalism is false. Although presenting the problem case 
would by itself be sufficient for refuting internalism, the general challenge suggests 
something more interesting, viz. that internalism fundamentally mischaracterizes the 
nature of justifiers. That, at any rate, is what I will argue. 
 The general challenge is this: What is it about internal factors in virtue of which 
they would be uniquely suited to determine a given agent’s justificatory status? More 
precisely, in virtue of what would either an agent’s mental states, or factors to which the 
agent has internal access, be uniquely suited to determine whether and to what extent the 
agent has justification for some belief? After all, an agent’s justificatory status is an 
epistemic property, while being a mental state and being an internally accessible factor 
are not. So, the challenge goes, why would an epistemic property – that of having a 
particular justificatory status – be determined only by factors which are delineated by 
non-epistemic distinctions such as that between mental and non-mental states, or between 
internal or non-internal access? 
Although I think this general challenge is ultimately devastating for internalism, it 
is not at first obvious why it would be. After all, a similar challenge faces any account of 
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one property in terms of a different kind of property, but not all such accounts are thereby 
inadequate. Certain forms of utilitarianism, for example, are accounts of ethical 
properties in terms of non-ethical properties such as happiness or preference-satisfaction. 
But, surely, pointing that out is not by itself enough to show that utilitarianism is false. 
Analogously, internalism isn’t shown to be false just by noting that it says that an 
epistemic property is determined solely by factors that share certain non-epistemic 
properties. So, as I happily grant, the general challenge must be substantiated by 
presenting clear counterexamples to the internalist claim that justification is determined 
by internal factors. 
However, the general challenge provides us with a recipe for such 
counterexamples. The recipe is this: First take a case in which an agent has by 
internalism’s own lights justification for some proposition. Or, as I prefer to do, take a 
case in which two agents have by internalism’s own lights different degrees of 
justification for some proposition. Next take an analogous case in which a pair of agents 
are epistemically as close to the first pair of agents as possible, but this time make sure 
there is no internal difference and only an external difference between the agents in the 
pair. Then argue that the agents in the second pair are also justified to different degrees. If 
we get that far, we can conclude that justification isn’t determined only by internal 
properties, i.e. that internalism is false. It also suggests that it is really the epistemic 
properties that were held fixed (as far as possible) which are relevant to justification, and 
not any kind of non-epistemically demarcated set of properties. That is indeed what I 
shall go on to propose in the following section. 
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Note that this recipe differs from Gibbons’s strategy for producing 
counterexamples in at least three respects. First, it is maximally neutral on what exactly is 
relevant to justification. The recipe takes whatever internalists think is relevant – 
memories, inferential abilities, or whatever – and argues that there are epistemically 
similar external factors that are also relevant for justification. Second, it also differs from 
Gibbons’s strategy in that no essential use is made of contestable intuitions. Finally, the 
recipe differs from Gibbons’s strategy in that it applies to justification-conferrers just as 
well as to mere justification-underminers. 
Now that we have the recipe, we can start cooking up counterexamples.21 
Consider Sally, who has a host of memories which provide her with justification for the 
proposition that Obama won the last presidential election. These may be memories from 
television programs, from conversations with other people, or whatever. Mary has no 
such memories, but she is otherwise exactly like Sally. To make things as simple as 
possible, let us suppose that nothing else relevant to Obama’s victory is in any sense 
available to either Sally or Mary. Let us also suppose, for simplicity, that neither Mary 
nor Sally has any beliefs about Obama, although Sally is of course disposed to believe 
that Obama won the election in various circumstances, e.g. when asked whether Obama 
won. Right now, however, Sally believes nothing about Obama. 
It seems clear enough that the proposition that Obama won the last presidential 
election is more justified for Sally than for Mary. In fact, most of us would probably be 
inclined to say that Sally is justified without qualification while Mary is not justified at 
all. This is an easy case for internalists: On mentalism, Sally is more justified than Mary 
                                                
21 Throughout this section, I will focus on an example that concerns memorial justification, i.e. 
justification in virtue of memory. But I will also indicate at the end of the section how the 
example might just as well have been about other kinds of justification. 
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because Sally has memories that Mary doesn’t have, and those memories are part of 
Sally’s mental states. On accessibilism, Sally is more justified than Mary because Sally 
has internal access to memories concerning Obama’s victory while Mary has no such 
memories and thus no internal access to them. Indeed, the case of Sally and Mary would 
seem to provide further support for internalism, especially if it were part of the best 
explanation argument (discussed in section 2 above).22 
Now consider a different but related case. Suppose that, for whatever reasons, 
Sally* and Mary* are both very attached to their notebooks. Their attachment is 
manifested in the fact that, for some propositions p1, p2, ..., pn, when asked about their 
reasons for believing one of those propositions pi (where 1 ≤ i ≤ n), or when pi is called 
into question, Sally* and Mary* will both open their notebooks and look for information 
relevant to pi. (Let us suppose that the notebooks are somehow organized so that Sally* 
and Mary* can, for any of the propositions p1, p2, ..., pn, easily find the relevant 
information when the notebooks contain any such information.) Suppose also that that the 
proposition that Obama won the last presidential election is one of the propositions p1, p2, 
..., pn. Suppose further that Sally* and Mary* are mental duplicates, i.e. that they are in 
exactly the same mental states, and that they, like Sally and Mary, have no belief about 
whether Obama won the last presidential election. Finally, let us suppose that the only 
difference between Sally* and Mary* is that Sally*’s notebook contains notes on 
Obama’s victory in the last presidential election while Mary*’s notebook does not. Note 
that if, as we are assuming, Sally* and Mary* haven’t yet opened their notebooks, then 
                                                
22 However, Feldman (1988) resists the intuitive judgment that agents like Sally and Mary really 
differ in their justificatory statuses. I discuss this view as an objection to my argument below.  
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there is no internal difference between Sally* and Mary*. The difference between Sally* 
and Mary* is entirely external. 
Although I have said quite a lot about Sally* and Mary*, there are some possibly 
important details I haven’t said anything about. First of all, I haven’t said whether the 
notes in Sally*’s and Mary*’s notebooks were written by Sally* and Mary* respectively. 
It is completely compatible with what I will go on to say that the notes were written by 
someone else altogether. Second, I haven’t said whether Sally* and Mary* would 
automatically endorse the information in the notebooks. Again, everything I’ll say about 
the case is compatible with Sally* and Mary* being quite skeptical about the information 
in their notebooks. Third, I haven’t said whether the fact that Sally* and Mary* consult 
their notebooks so often is due to some form of memory loss or not. Once again, it’s 
compatible with what I’ll go on to say about the case that Sally*’s and Mary*’s natural 
abilities to form and retrieve memories are perfectly in order. Fourth, I left open whether 
Sally* and Mary* would consult their notebooks regarding all propositions, or just some. 
In fact, for all I have said, it could be the case that Sally* and Mary* would only consult 
their notebooks when the proposition that Obama won the last presidential election is 
called into question, or when they are asked about their reasons for believing that 
proposition. I mention these four ways of specifying the case – all of which are 
compatible with everything I will go on to say – because it may alleviate the concern that 
Sally*’s and Mary*’s notebooks are in fact their respective memories, and so in that 
sense internal to their minds. These are only preliminary comments, however. I will 
address this concern in much more detail in section 7. 
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The question, of course, is whether Sally*’s justification for the belief that Obama 
won the last presidential election is greater than Mary*’s, even if and when Sally* and 
Mary* haven’t opened their notebooks. The answer, I will argue, is ‘yes’. One way to 
argue for that is to appeal directly to people’s intuitions about the case. It does indeed 
seem to me that, intuitively, Sally* is more justified than Mary*. However, I don’t want 
to rest my case on easily contested intuitions if I don’t have to. So, let me now give two 
arguments for Sally* being more justified than Mary*, neither of which relies on such 
intuitions. 
 
4.1. The First Argument 
The first argument concerns the epistemic contrasts between Sally and Mary on the one 
hand and Sally* and Mary* on the other. The structure of the argument is very simple: 
(1) Sally is more justified than Mary. 
(2) If Sally is more justified than Mary, then Sally* is more justified than Mary*. 
(3) Therefore, Sally* is more justified than Mary*. [Follows from (1) and (2).] 
The argument is obviously valid. So let us go through the premises. 
We have already noted that the first premise, (1), is very plausible. I see only two 
ways of rejecting it. First, one could reject that memories ever justify beliefs. That is not 
a view I will take seriously here. On a slightly more plausible view, memories, including 
stored beliefs,23 do not justify at a particular time unless they are being remembered at 
                                                
23 So, as I will use ‘memory’, anything that can be stored and retrieved by one’s mental faculties 
is a memory. 
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that time. This is roughly Feldman’s (1988) view.24 On this view, before Sally recalls 
seeing Obama’s inaugural speech on the television, recalls her sister calling her up to tell 
her how happy she was that Obama won, etc., Sally does not have more justification for 
believing that Obama won the election than Mary does. There are at least two serious 
problems with this proposal. 
First, on Feldman’s proposal, many of our seemingly reasonable utterances would 
not be justified, since we often make seemingly reasonable claims based on memories 
that are not being remembered at the time the claims are made. Admittedly, there might 
be a strong sense of ‘belief’ according to which our beliefs are automatically 
accompanied by us recalling memories which justify those beliefs. But then it does not 
seem to be the case that, in this sense, we believe a lot of what we say, even when we are 
being sincere and serious.25 Suppose, for example, that Kelly is just like Sally except that 
Kelly does believe, in the weaker and more ordinary sense (according to which believing 
does not require that one is recalling one’s justification for that belief), that Obama won 
the last presidential election. Kelly might sincerely and seriously say to her friend, 
without thinking much about it at all, ‘Obama won the election’. Let us assume that Kelly 
isn’t currently recalling anything supporting this statement, e.g. memories of seeing 
Obama’s inaugural speech on the television, or of getting a phone call from her sister 
about how happy she was that Obama won, etc. In the strong sense of ‘believe’, Kelly 
                                                
24 More precisely, Feldman’s view is that only propositions that are currently being thought of at 
a time are evidence at that time. This, coupled with Feldman and Conee’s (1985) view that one’s 
justification is determined by the evidence one has, gets us the view that only propositions which 
are currently being thought of can justify beliefs. One implication of this view is the current 
proposal, viz. that only memories that are currently being remembered can justify beliefs. 
 
25 The reason for the qualification is that we sometimes say things we don’t really believe in any 
sense, e.g. when lying and telling jokes. 
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would not really believe that Obama won the election. Whatever she does believe, 
however, Feldman’s proposal entails that Kelly’s utterance of ‘Obama won the election’ 
would not be justified at all. Feldman’s proposal thus implies a kind of skepticism about 
the justification of many, perhaps most, of our utterances, viz. those utterances that are 
not accompanied by a remembering of one’s justification for whatever is being uttered. 
Second, Feldman’s proposal implies a strange kind of skepticism about many of 
our occurrent beliefs, even those which are accompanied by us recalling the memories 
that justify those beliefs. The problem is this: Even if, when we believe some proposition 
p, we recall other beliefs q1, q2, ..., qn that support p, the recalled beliefs q1, q2, ..., qn 
might themselves be supported only by yet other stored beliefs r1, r2, ..., rm, which, unlike 
q1, q2, ..., qn, are not recalled when p is occurrently believed. But, on Feldman’s proposal, 
the recalled beliefs q1, q2, ..., qn would then not be justified, because r1, r2, ..., rm are not 
currently being recalled. But if q1, q2, ..., qn are not justified, how could q1, q2, ..., qn 
confer justification on p? It seems clear that they could not. For, surely, beliefs that are 
themselves not justified cannot confer justification on other beliefs. The conclusion is 
thus that, in such a case, p itself would not be justified. 
Now, not all cases are like this, only some. The case of one’s justification for 
believing that Obama won the election, for example, is probably not such a case. But 
there are still plenty of such cases. For example, suppose I believe now that I am a good 
chess player. I automatically recall my justification for this belief: That I have won most 
of my games of chess. But suppose that I do not also automatically recall anything that 
justifies me in believing that I have won most of my games – I do not, e.g., recall 
checkmating any of my opponents. In that case, it seems that on Feldman’s proposal I am 
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not now justified in believing that I have won most of my games of chess. And so it 
seems that I would not now be justified in thinking that I am a good chess player either. I 
take it that this is an undesired consequence, even for Feldman, for we would think that 
currently remembering that I have won most of my games is more than enough to justify 
me – at least to some extent – in believing that I am a good chess player. In general, 
Feldman’s proposal seems to imply a strange kind of skepticism about those of our 
beliefs which are justified by stored beliefs which, in turn, can only be justified by further 
stored beliefs. I say that this is a ‘strange kind of skepticism’ because some of these 
beliefs seem to be at least as well justified as many other beliefs. 
For the two reasons given here, Feldman’s proposal is extremely implausible. I 
see no other remotely plausible way to deny that Sally is more justified than Mary. I thus 
conclude that premise (1) cannot plausibly be rejected. 
It is time to consider premise (2). What might be said in its defense? Well, this: 
There doesn’t seem to be anything justificationally relevant – indeed, epistemically 
relevant – that Sally has over Mary but that Sally* does not also have over Mary*. There 
might of course be differences of degree – perhaps the extent to which Sally has 
something justificationally relevant over Mary is greater than the extent to which Sally* 
has that exact same thing over Mary*. But even a difference of degree would, of course, 
prove my point that Sally* is more justified than Mary*. Now, to substantiate my claim 
that there is no such relevant epistemic difference, except perhaps one of degree, let me 
invite you to consider the following epistemic properties shared by Sally and Sally* 
(although admittedly perhaps to different degrees), and lacked completely by Mary and 
Mary*: 
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(a) Giving reasons: Sally and Sally* can both tell other people why someone should 
believe that Obama won the election, whereas Mary and Mary* cannot. 
(b) Adjusting beliefs: Sally and Sally* can both adjust their beliefs in accordance with 
the information they have on Obama’s victory so as to make those beliefs more 
likely to be true, whereas Mary and Mary* can do no such thing. 
(c) Justificatory robustness: In the event of being presented with evidence against 
Obama having won the election (e.g. evidence that McCain won the election), 
Sally and Sally* should both have a certain inertia against believing that Obama 
did not win the election. Moreover, Sally and Sally* would be epistemically 
responsible in discarding this evidence, at least in some cases. Nothing of that sort 
is true of Mary and Mary*, who should both believe that Obama did not win the 
election if presented with evidence to that effect. Moreover, Mary and Mary* 
would both be epistemically irresponsible were they to discard such evidence. 
(d) Counterfactual dependence: If Obama had not won the election, then it is very 
unlikely that Sally and Sally* would still have the characteristics described in (a), 
(b) and (c), whereas it is very likely that Mary and Mary* would still have the 
characteristics attributed to them. 
I am not claiming that this is an exhaustive list of the epistemic properties involved in 
having justification for believing something. If the internalist can come up with an 
epistemic property that is not to any degree shared by Sally and Sally* (as contrasted 
with Mary and Mary*), and that property cannot be added to Sally* without changing her 
internally, then I’ll admit that the internalist would have refuted this argument. But the 
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list should at least provide pretty impressive inductive support for there not being any 
such epistemic properties. 
I have argued that there is no epistemic difference, except perhaps one of degree, 
between the way in which Sally differs from Mary, on the one hand, and the way in 
which Sally* differs from Mary* on the other. There is of course a difference between 
the way in which Sally differs from Mary and the way in which Sally* differs from 
Mary*: In the case of Sally and Mary, the contrast is due to differences in Sally and 
Mary’s minds, or more specifically in their memories, whereas in the case of Sally* and 
Mary* the contrast is due to differences in things located outside of Sally* and Mary*’s 
minds, viz. their notebooks. But the question is whether there is a relevant epistemic 
difference between the two contrasts. And, of course, the mere fact that there is a 
difference is by itself no reason to think there is also an epistemic difference – that would 
be to blatantly beg the question against this argument. Hence I conclude that the above 
considerations show that Sally* and Mary* differ epistemically in the same way as Sally 
and Mary do, and so that if Sally is more justified than Mary, then Sally* is more 
justified than Mary*. Since Sally is more justified than Mary, it follows that Sally* is 
more justified than Mary*. 
 
4.2. The Second Argument 
If you’re not convinced by the first argument, here is another argument for the same 
conclusion:26 
                                                
26 This argument doesn’t quite follow the recipe from the beginning of this section (although it 
does have many of the same ingredients). 
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(1) Being able to justify a proposition p quickly and reliably in various circumstances 
is sufficient for having justification (at least to some extent) for believing p. 
(2) Sally* is able to justify that Obama won the last presidential election quickly and 
reliably in various circumstances. 
(3) Therefore, Sally* has justification (at least to some extent) for believing that 
Obama won the last presidential election. [Follows from (1) and (2).] 
(4) Mary* has no justification (to any extent) for believing that Obama won the last 
presidential election. 
(5) Therefore, Sally* has more justification than Mary* for believing that Obama 
won the last presidential election. [Follows from (3) and (4).] 
The argument is valid. What should we say about the premises? I don’t expect much 
resistance to (2), for surely Sally* can justify that Obama won the election in the very 
same sense that the rest of us can when we appeal to memories supporting this belief of 
ours. That’s just true in virtue of how I stipulated the case. So the pressure is on premises 
(1) and (4). I’ll discuss them in turn. 
 Regarding (1), it is true that the nature of the relation between being justified and 
being able to justify is somewhat controversial. But what is controversial is whether 
being able to justify is necessary for being justified. Against this, some argue that a large 
class of epistemic agents, e.g. small children, non-human animals and the cognitively 
impaired, may have justification for believing p without being able to justify p.27 All of 
that is consistent with (1). For notice that (1) is not a claim about what is necessary for 
                                                
27 Interestingly, Leite (2004) argues, with some qualifications, that to be able to justify is 
necessary and sufficient for being justified. The kind of justification Leite is concerned with, 
however, is doxastic and not merely propositional justification. 
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being justified. Rather, (1) says that being able to justify quickly and reliably in various 
circumstances is sufficient for being justified to some extent – i.e. that anyone who is able 
to justify p quickly and reliably in various circumstances is at least justified to some 
extent in believing p. The qualification ‘quickly and reliably in various circumstances’ 
serves to rule out various cases in which the agent merely happens to be able to justify p 
in the particular circumstances she finds herself in at some particular time, and cases in 
which justifying p requires her to do some significant investigation.28 So qualified, I 
know of no plausible objection to the quite weak claim expressed in (1). 
Now, (1) only implies that Sally* is justified (to some extent), not also that Mary* 
is not justified (to any extent). Accordingly, the latter claim is a separate premise in the 
argument – premise (4). The premise is supported by the simple fact that Mary* is 
exactly like Mary, who has no memories of Obama winning the election, except that 
Mary* also has a notebook which contains nothing relevant to Obama’s victory. 
Moreover, the premise isn’t undermined by the existence of cases in which people are 
justified in believing something without being able to justify it. It is true, of course, that 
Mary* is not able to justify the proposition that Obama won the election. But the reason 
she isn’t has nothing to do with the sorts of things typically true of those who are taken as 
examples of people who are justified without being able to justify: She is not a child, not 
a non-human animal, not cognitively impaired (at least not any more that Sally*), etc. So 
                                                
28 This is not meant to imply that there is a sharp line to be drawn between being able to justify 
and not being able to justify. All that is being claimed here is that there is a point at which an 
agent is able to justify a proposition so quickly and so reliably, in so many various circumstances, 
that this agent must have some justification for that proposition, and that Sally* is able to justify 
the proposition that Obama won the last presidential election that quickly, and that reliably, in 
that many various circumstances. 
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there is no reason to think Mary* might have justification for believing that Obama won 
the election even though she, unlike Sally*, cannot justify it. 
So we have another argument for Sally* being more justified than Mary*. I 
suspect that the internalist will want to continue to push on premise (1), presumably by 
somehow restricting the claim to the kind of ability to justify Sally has but Sally* lacks. 
In particular, she might argue that the ‘ability to justify’ to which we’re referring to in (1) 
should be restricted to the ability to justify using only mental states, or internally 
accessible factors. As before, however, the burden is on the internalist to provide some 
non-question begging reasons for thinking that this is the only sense in which the premise 
is true. After all, we didn’t have to mention mental states or internal access in the premise 
to make it convincing. So the prospects for finding a non-question-begging way of 
restricting premise (1) seem bleak. 
 
4.3. What the Arguments Show 
Let us take stock. I have argued that Sally* and Mary* differ in their justificatory 
statuses. By stipulation, however, Sally* and Mary* are exactly alike mentally – they 
differ only with regard to the notes in their notebooks. We thus have an example of 
individuals who are exactly alike mentally but are not exactly alike justificationally. So 
this is a counterexample to mentalism.29 It is also a counterexample to accessibilism. For 
note that Sally*’s and Mary*’s access to their notebooks is not a purely cognitive kind of 
access, nor is it access by reflection alone. Rather, Sally*’s access requires her to be able 
to open her notebook and read from it. More generally, it requires perception and some 
                                                
29 A little more precisely, it is a counterexample to M and thus, by implication, to S. (See section 
1.) 
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relatively straightforward manipulation of her external environment. Hence accessibilism, 
as we characterized it above, must also be false. The example thus falsifies both versions 
of internalism, mentalism and accessibilism. 
 The counterexample I have discussed is not one of a kind. For example, I could 
have presented a counterexample in which two agents have certain inferential abilities, in 
one case simply in virtue of the agent’s mental states and in the other with the help of 
some external machinery, e.g. a calculator. The idea is just to take whatever epistemic 
properties in virtue of which an agent has justification, and, if they happen to be internal 
to her mind, then make those epistemic properties external. Now, I should mention again 
that some philosophers might think that this just goes to show that the notes in Sally*’s 
notebook are in fact part of her mind.30 Although I have tried to stipulate the case so that 
this would not follow, I suspect that some readers will still be worried that this somehow 
undermines the argument just given against internalism. Accordingly, I will address this 
concern in detail in section 7. Let me just say for now that I will argue there that this 
concern is both mistaken and irrelevant. 
 Let me end this section by connecting up my counterexample to internalism with 
the general challenge I mentioned at the beginning of the section. The challenge was for 
internalism to present a reason for thinking that an agent’s justificatory status – an 
epistemic property – is determined solely by a set of factors that are essentially restricted 
by some non-epistemic distinction. The counterexamples show that the internalist way of 
non-epistemically restricting the factors relevant to epistemic justification does not work. 
They don’t show that no such non-epistemic restriction could possibly work. Indeed, one 
is guaranteed to find such a non-epistemic restriction by just making the restriction 
                                                
30 I am referring to Clark and Chalmers’s (1998) extended mind thesis (EMT). 
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sufficiently weak. (Here is one: Justification supervenes on the totality of facts about the 
world.) The problem is that such an account would not be as informative as we would 
like: It would only tell us of some set of factors that some of them are relevant, and that 
factors outside of that set are irrelevant. It would not also tell us which of the factors in 
the set are actually, or even possibly, relevant to justification. Reflecting on all of this, we 
might begin to suspect that that it is completely wrongheaded to search for a sufficiently 
large non-epistemically demarcated set of factors for justification to supervene on. 
Accordingly, I suggest that we move on to find an epistemic way of demarcating the 
factors that are relevant to justification. That is the task to which I now turn. 
 
5. Externalist Accessibilism 
If my arguments in the previous section are sound, Sally* and Mary* constitute a 
counterexample to internalism. This is because Sally* has more justification for believing 
that Obama won the last presidential election than Mary*, even though Sally* and Mary* 
are internally indistinguishable. An adequate theory of justifiers must account for this 
fact. So, in searching for a theory to replace internalism with, it will be instructive to ask 
why Sally* has more justification than Mary* for believing that Obama won. Here is a 
preliminary suggestion: Sally* has a kind of access that Mary* lacks to justifiers for the 
proposition that Obama won the election. But this access cannot be the internal access of 
accessibilism, since Sally* doesn’t have that kind of access to anything that’s relevant to 
Obama having won the election. The task of this section is to describe the different kind 
of access that Sally* has to the notes in her notebook – call it epistemic access – and 
suggest that justification supervenes on factors to which we have that kind of access. 
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We must now choose between two ways to proceed. First, we could define or 
describe some notion of specifically external access – the kind of external access Sally* 
has to the notes in her notebook – and simply add the factors to which an agent has this 
kind of external access to the internal factors which our favorite internalist theory claims 
is relevant to an agent’s justificatory status. This has the possible disadvantage of not 
giving us the most general account of access available. But that doesn’t mean it is the 
wrong way to go, of course. For perhaps there really are two fundamentally different 
kinds of factors – or fundamentally different kinds of access – in virtue of which an 
agent’s justificatory status is determined. As it happens, I don’t think there are two such 
fundamentally different kinds of factors or access. Rather, I will argue that there is a 
unified story to be told about the factors that are relevant to justification. So my approach 
in finding a new theory to replace internalism with is not to identify some kind of 
specifically external access, but rather to give a general account of epistemic access that 
covers both the internal access that, e.g., Sally has to her memories, and the external 
access that, e.g., Sally* has to the notes in her notebook. 
As I said before, the case of Sally* and Mary* is instructive in finding this new 
unified account of epistemic access. So let me say what I think is the relevant notion of 
epistemic access in virtue of which Sally* is more justified than Mary* in believing that 
Obama won the last presidential election. It concerns the fact that Sally* would consult 
the notes in her notebook in the right situations. Now, when I say ‘would consult’, I don’t 
mean ‘would try to consult’ – I mean ‘would successfully consult’. So here ‘would’ 
implies ‘could’. But it’s not merely that Sally* could successfully consult her notes. More 
is required in order for Sally*’s notes to be relevant to her justificatory status. To see that, 
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consider the following case: Suppose Mary* has been carrying around an exact copy of 
Sally*’s notebook, and suppose further that, unlike Sally*, Mary* would not be at all 
inclined to consult the notes in that notebook. (Perhaps she just thinks the notebook is 
pretty.) Now even though Mary* has an exact copy of Sally*’s notebook, and so she 
could consult the notes, she still doesn’t seem to be any more justified than before. But, 
as we have now set up the case, Sally* and Mary* are exactly the same – inside and 
outside – except for facts about what Sally* and Mary* would consult. So facts about 
what an agent would consult, as opposed to what an agent merely could consult, seem to 
be at least part of what makes Sally* more justified than Mary*. 
 What is it for an agent to consult something? I don’t have a general story about 
consulting, and I don’t think I need to. Here are some clear cases of consulting: Sally* 
consults her notebook when she reads from it; Sally consults her memory when she 
recalls something; I consult a friend when I ask her whether it is raining outside; a student 
consults her calculator when calculating the product of two large numbers. Perhaps the 
relevant notion of consulting has something to do with making use of something, along 
perhaps with granting the authority of the thing one is making use of (but not necessarily 
automatically endorsing whatever it says). But then again I’m not sure. I would give you 
a general story if I thought that such a story would be helpful to make you understand 
what the notion of consulting is that I’m using, but I suspect that the best way to convey 
what the notion is is simply to appeal to the antecedently understood notion of consulting 
along with giving examples like those given above. 
Three difficult issues need to be addressed at this point. First, I am claiming that 
the epistemic access Sally* has to the notes in her notebook consists in her having a 
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disposition to consult her notebook and in that disposition being manifested in the right 
situations. What are those situations? In other words, when does Sally* have to actually 
consult the notes in her notebook in order for her to have epistemic access to them? Only 
when she needs to, of course.31 But when does she need to? The answer to this question is 
far from obvious, in my view, and perhaps there is no answer that is both adequate and 
fully general. One kind of situation in which she needs to consult the notes is when 
consulting them makes a difference to what she believes.32 But these may not be the only 
kind of situations in which Sally* needs to consult her notes. She may need them also if 
and when she must justify a proposition to another person, even if Sally* has already, so 
to speak, made up her mind about that proposition. Perhaps there are yet other kinds of 
situations, apart from the two kinds already mentioned, in which Sally* needs to use her 
notes in the relevant sense. In order to avoid that issue, let us call the kinds of situations 
in which Sally* needs to use her notes in the relevant sense (including but not necessarily 
exhausted by situations in which consulting a factor makes a difference to what one 
believes and to what one is able to justify to others) situations in which consulting a 
factor makes an epistemic difference. Importantly for our purposes, however, to say that 
something makes an epistemic difference is not to say that it makes a justificatory 
                                                
31 But not necessarily every time she needs to. On my view, something can make a difference to 
justification even though it’s not always present when one needs it. As I will explain below, I 
think that whether something makes a difference to justification is not binary, but comes in 
degrees depending, among other things, on the circumstances in which an agent would consult it. 
 
32 This might sound as if I’m assuming some sort of doxastic voluntarism, i.e. the view that 
believing is voluntary. I’m not. I’m not claiming that Sally* is at all capable of deciding to 
believe something other than what she believes. But I do think that Sally*’s beliefs, and everyone 
else’s, are determined at some point. I also think that the factors agents consult when their beliefs 
are being determined will, at least for rational agents, often strongly affect what beliefs they have. 
Nothing here rests on an the assumption that agents can decide what they believe, only on the 
assumption that there are times at which agents’ beliefs are being determined, and that how those 
beliefs are determined is affected by what the agents consult. 
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difference, since that would threaten to make the account I am proposing below circular. 
In sum, then, making an epistemic difference includes making a difference to what one 
believes and making a difference to what one is able to justify, but not making a 
difference to what one has justification for believing. 
A second difficult issue stems from the fact that the notion of having a disposition 
to consult something in certain situations is a modal notion. As is the case with many 
modal notions, some possibilities are clearly more relevant than others in determining 
whether the notion applies. For example, consider a possible situation in which Sally* 
would not successfully consult the notes in her notebook because an evil demon has 
erased all the notes. This possibility is not as relevant as, for instance, the possibility that 
Sally*’s notebook is stolen from her. What seems to make the difference is the fact that 
one possibility, the stealing of the notebook, is salient to us while the other, the demon 
erasing the notes, is clearly not. It is a difficult question – and one that I cannot answer 
here – why some possibilities are salient to us while others are quite clearly not. Suffice it 
to say that only the salient possibilities make a significant difference to the epistemic 
access Sally* has to the notes in her notebook. 
The third and final issue is that not all consulting is epistemically on a par. Some 
consulting requires significant investigation on the agent’s behalf, and it seems plausible 
to suppose that the amount of investigation required is highly relevant to the extent to 
which the disposition to consult a factor determines that agent’s justificatory status. What 
counts as a significant investigation is not easy to specify, and I do not think there is any 
sharp line to be drawn here. (More on that shortly.) Fortunately, since we already have an 
intuitive grasp of what is involved in an investigation, and thus of what is involved in a 
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significant investigation, this is not much of a problem – we can just use this pre-
theoretical and antecedently understood concept of investigation in our explication of 
epistemic access. Nevertheless, we can shed some light on this concept by pointing to a 
few central elements involved in a significant investigation. 
Most obviously, two elements relevant to whether something counts as a 
significant investigation are the time and the effort required by the agent. If consulting F 
requires significant time or effort, then there is a clear sense in which consulting F 
requires a significant investigation. Perhaps more importantly, it seems relevant how 
many other factors the agent must consult in order to consult the relevant factor F – if the 
agent must consult a lot of other factors in order to consult F, then that may plausibly 
count as a significant investigation. To see what this last point amounts to, consider 
someone who must consult her whole bookcase in order to consult some particular 
information in one of her books. Since she doesn’t know which book contains the 
relevant information, she will simply read through all of them. Even if she happened, for 
some reason, to be able to read all the books very quickly and with no effort, we would 
presumably still count her as having to do a significant investigation in order to consult 
the relevant information. If all this is right, then an extremely rough characterization of 
what is involved in a significant investigation is (a) significant time, (b) significant effort, 
and (c) consulting of multiple factors. Let me emphasize, however, that these may only 
be some of the elements involved in a significant investigation. I will be using the 
antecedently understood concept of a significant investigation in what follows, not an 
artificial one defined in terms of (a), (b) and (c) – my hope is only that (a), (b) and (c) 
help to shed some light on this antecedently understood concept. 
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To sum up, here is my preliminary suggestion, subject to subsequent clarifications 
and qualifications, for the kind of access Sally* has to the notes in her notebook: 
S has epistemic access to a factor F if and only if S would, without doing any 
significant investigation, consult F in some of the salient situations in which 
consulting F makes an epistemic difference to S. 
Note that this is intended as a definition of epistemic access, not as an account of an 
intuitive concept. An obvious criterion for the adequacy of this definition is that Sally*, 
but not Mary*, should count as having epistemic access to the notes in her notebook that 
are relevant to Obama’s victory. To see that this criterion is satisfied, note that Sally* 
would (successfully) consult the notes in her notebook without undertaking any 
significant investigation in most salient situations in which doing so makes a difference 
to what she believes or is able to justify. Mary*, by contrast, cannot do any such thing in 
most salient circumstances without thereby doing some significant investigation into 
whether Obama won the election. Thus, I suggest that the difference between Sally*’s 
and Mary*’s justificatory statuses is explained by a difference in the factors epistemically 
accessible, in the above sense, to Sally* and Mary*. 
Before I can state my theory of what justification supervenes on, using the above 
notion of epistemic access, a very important point must be made. Epistemic access, as 
defined above, comes in degrees. This is so for at least three reasons. First, it is obviously 
a matter of degree how many salient circumstances in which consulting a factor F would 
make an epistemic difference to an agent S are actually such that S would (successfully) 
consult F. All else being equal, the more there are of such circumstances the more access 
S has to F. Second, it is also a matter of degree how salient those circumstances are to us. 
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All else being equal, the more salient the circumstances are in which S would consult F, 
the more access S has to F. Third, and perhaps most importantly, it is a matter of degree 
how much investigation S would have to do in order to consult F. All else being equal, 
the less investigation required of S to consult F, the more access S has to F. In sum, then, 
the degree of epistemic access S has to F depends on the number of relevant 
circumstances in which S would consult F, the salience of those circumstances, and the 
amount of investigation required for S to consult F. 
So epistemic access comes in degrees. This, I claim, is a desirable feature of the 
notion of epistemic access. To see why, consider the way in which Sally*’s access to her 
notebook differs from Sally’s access to her memory. Why is there this difference? The 
gradability of epistemic access, as spelled out above, provides us with an explanation. For 
there are many salient circumstances in which Sally would consult something relevant to 
the proposition that Obama won the election while Sally* would not. For example, 
Sally*’s notebook could easily be stolen, in which case Sally* could not consult the 
notes, whereas Sally still could consult her memories. Of course, there are also possible 
circumstances in which Sally could not consult her memories, but those are not nearly as 
salient as those in which Sally* could not consult her notes. So, the number and salience 
of the circumstances in which Sally and Sally* would consult their memories/notes 
together explain the difference in their justificatory statuses. In addition, the justificatory 
difference between Sally and Sally* is also explained by the fact that Sally* would have 
to do more investigation in order to consult her notes than Sally would have to do in 
order to consult her memories. After all, looking something up in a notebook requires 
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more time, more effort, and more consulting of other factors than recalling it from 
memory. 
We should note that the gradability of access and its effect on an agent’s 
justificatory status is not peculiar to justifiers which are located outside our heads. I’ll 
illustrate this point by modifying the case of Bob and Ray from section 2. Consider Bob* 
and Ray*, who like Bob and Ray spend their morning reading the weather report in 
yesterday’s newspaper. Unlike Bob and Ray, however, suppose that Bob* and Ray* both 
stayed inside the hotel for the whole day. Suppose further that Bob* kept his memory of 
the warm weather firmly in mind the whole day, whereas Ray*, having first read the 
weather report, went on to spend the day at a conference inside the hotel. In the evening 
that same day, then, Bob* has been thinking about the weather all day, whereas Ray* 
barely remembers what he read about the weather. With some difficulty, however, Ray* 
is able to remember what he read in the morning, but only when he’s thinking hard about 
it. Now, if epistemic access did not come in degrees, we would have to say that Bob* and 
Ray* are equally justified in believing that it’s warm outside. After all, Bob and Ray have 
epistemic access to the same factors. But this just doesn’t seem to be the correct verdict 
about this case. We should say, rather, that Bob* is more justified than Ray*. 
If there are degrees of epistemic access, spelled out in the way I suggested above, 
then it is easy to make sense of this. There are salient possible circumstances in which 
Bob* would easily be able to consult his memory of the weather report whereas Ray* 
would not. There are circumstances, for instance, in which Ray*’s memorial retrieval 
would be too slow to make any difference to what he believes. And there are also 
circumstances in which Ray* could not at all retrieve that piece of information from his 
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memory, e.g. because of extreme stress. Moreover, Ray* would have to do more 
investigation than Bob*, in the relevant sense, in order to recall the weather report, since 
Ray*’s recalling would at least require more time and effort than Bob*’s. This nicely 
explains the intuitive difference in justificatory statuses between Bob* and Ray*, even 
though both have the same memories relevant to the weather outside. So the gradability 
of epistemic access is not peculiar to the epistemic access we have to external factors. 
Epistemic access comes in degrees irrespective of what it is access to. 
With the notion of epistemic access, as defined above, reminding ourselves that 
epistemic access is a matter of degree, we can now finally formulate a theory of what 
determines an agent’s justificatory status – an alternative to traditional versions of 
internalism and externalism about justification: 
Externalist accessibilism (EA): S’s justificatory status is fully determined by 
(i) the factors to which S has epistemic access; 
(ii) the degree of S’s epistemic access to those factors.33 
To avoid confusion in what follows, I will now refer to the standard, internalist, version 
of accessibilism as ‘internalist accessibilism’. 
An important implication of externalist accessibilism is that if two possible 
individuals have exactly the same degree of epistemic access to exactly the same factors, 
then they are exactly alike justificationally. Since epistemic access can be access to 
external factors, e.g. notes in a notebook, it is clear that on this theory external factors can 
                                                
33 If you don’t think that it makes sense to say that epistemic access comes in degrees (perhaps 
because you think that epistemic access cannot be quantified), then feel free to substitute ‘nature’ 
for ‘degree’ here and in what follows. So modified, (ii) would claim only that S’s justificatory 
status is determined by the nature of the epistemic access S has to her justifiers, e.g. the nature of 
Bob*’s and Ray*’s respective epistemic access to memories concerning today’s weather. This 
does not commit you to epistemic access coming in degrees – only to the claim that not all 
epistemic access is the same. 
 51 
be justifiers. Hence this is an externalist theory. However, I argue in the next section that 
externalist accessibilism is also supported by the arguments for internalism discussed in 
section 2 when those arguments have been modified so as to avoid otherwise devastating 
objections. In an important sense, externalist accessibilism is thus an internalist-friendly 
externalism about justification, for it accommodates some of the main considerations in 
favor of internalism even though it disagrees about what we should conclude from those 
considerations. 
 
6. Internalist Arguments for Externalist Accessibilism 
In this section, I return to the three arguments for internalism discussed in section 2. For 
each of these arguments, I argue that necessary modifications to the arguments transform 
them into arguments for externalist accessibilism rather than for any version of 
internalism. I should say, before we begin, that since my critiques and modifications of 
the arguments apply equally to mentalist and accessibilist versions of the arguments, I 
will not be distinguishing between them in this section. 
 
6.1. The Best Explanation Argument Revisited 
The first argument for internalism was Feldman and Conee’s best explanation argument. 
I will argue that, when all cases are taken into account, the best explanation argument 
supports externalist accessibilism rather than any kind of internalism. In arguing this, I 
unfortunately cannot go through all of the cases that were used in Feldman and Conee’s 
original argument. But let us see how it deals with the one case we did look at in section 
2, viz. the case of Bob and Ray.  
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Recall that, having read yesterday’s newspaper, Bob and Ray were equally 
justified in believing that it is very warm today. On externalist accessibilism, this is 
because Bob and Ray have identical epistemic access to identical justifiers for their belief 
that it is very warm today: Each of them would consult their memory of reading the 
newspaper in the same salient situations in which doing so makes an epistemic difference 
to them, and their doing so would require the same insignificant investigation on their 
part. When Bob goes outside and feels the heat, however, it is clear that he is more 
justified than Ray in believing that it is very warm today. On externalist accessibilism, 
this is explained by Bob’s epistemic access to the fact that it feels warm outside, which in 
turn is an enormously powerful justifier for the proposition that it is very warm outside. 
Ray has no similar degree of epistemic access to the fact that it feels warm outside, since 
that would both require significant investigation and not be among the things Ray could 
consult in a number of salient circumstances in which doing so makes an epistemic 
difference. To conclude, then, externalist accessibilism explains the contrast between Bob 
and Ray at least as well as internalism. 
So is the score even, as far as the best explanation argument goes, between 
internalism and externalist accessibilism? It is not. For recall the case of Sally* and 
Mary*, who relied on their notebooks for information regarding the proposition that 
Obama won the last presidential election. We concluded that Sally* is more justified than 
Mary* because the relevant part of Mary*’s notebook was empty whereas Sally*’s 
wasn’t. So this is one more case which must be included in the set of cases that 
internalism is supposed to explain. Unfortunately, internalism is no explanation of that 
set of cases. This is of course because there being a difference in Sally*’s and Mary*’s 
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justificatory statuses is inconsistent with internalism. So, although internalism can 
explain the case of Bob and Ray, and perhaps many other cases, it cannot explain all 
differences in justificatory statuses. Externalist accessibilism, at least as far as we have 
seen, can. So the best explanation of all known cases of contrasts in justificatory statuses 
is not internalism, but externalist accessibilism. To conclude, then, the best explanation 
argument, modified to accommodate the case of Sally* and Mary*, turns out to be an 
argument for externalist accessibilism rather than internalism. 
 
6.2. The Argument from Possession Revisited 
The second argument for internalism discussed in section 2 was the argument from 
possession: 
(1) S’s justificatory status with regard to some proposition p is fully determined by 
the reasons S has for (and against) believing that p. 
(2) Any reason S has for (or against) believing something must be internal to S. 
(3) Therefore, S’s justificatory status is fully determined by factors internal to S. 
[Follows from (1) and (2).] 
We can now ask: Is there any reason to restrict S’s reasons to what is internal to S, as (2) 
does? Would S not have or possess a particular reason if S has what I have called 
epistemic access to that reason? I don’t see why not. To bolster this intuition, recall that 
the notes in Sally*’s notebook are not internal to her. But the notes in the notebook still 
seem to be Sally*’s reasons for believing that Obama won the election – they still seem to 
be the reasons Sally* has or possesses for believing that Obama won. This shows that (2) 
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is too restrictive. We will have to replace it with something more inclusive if we want the 
argument from possession to be sound. 
 It might be tempting to simply replace (2) with: 
(2Esimple) Any reason S has for (or against) believing something must be 
epistemically accessible to S. 
As you might suspect, I think we are now on the right track. In fact, I think (2Esimple) is 
true, but I don’t think it tells the most informative story there is to tell about the 
relationship between having reasons and epistemic access. To see why, note that with 
regard to Sally*’s reasons for believing that Obama won the election, there is at least a 
crucial difference between the notes in Sally*’s notebook and, say, some newspaper that 
merely happens to be in front of Sally* at some particular moment (supposing, of course, 
that the newspaper contains some information relevant to the proposition that Obama 
won the last presidential election). But both the notes and the newspaper are, to some 
degree at least, epistemically accessible to Sally* at that moment, given that Sally* has 
the right disposition to consult both. The difference is that Sally* has a much lesser 
degree of epistemic access to the newspaper than to her notebook.34 And this seems 
highly relevant to whether information in the notebook and in the newspaper constitute 
Sally*’s reasons for believing that Obama won the election. A similar point applies to 
internal justifiers, as the case of Bob* and Ray* shows: It seems more reasonable to say 
of Bob* that he has a reason to believe that it is warm outside than it is to say that Ray* 
                                                
34 This lesser degree of epistemic access is due to two things. First, the newspaper is only 
available to Sally* in the current circumstances, and there are many salient possible 
circumstances in which Sally* cannot at all consult the newspaper, whereas there are much fewer 
such salient possible circumstances in which Sally* cannot consult her notebook. Second, Sally* 
would be undertaking more of an investigation, in the sense spelled out in section 5, by reading 
the newspaper than by reading the notebook. 
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has such a reason. This seems to be because, as we noted, Bob* has a greater degree of 
epistemic access to his memory of reading the weather report than Ray* has to his 
memory of doing the same thing. 
This might suggest that we should replace (2Esimple) with: 
(2Eextra) Any reason S has for (or against) believing some proposition p must be very 
epistemically accessible to S. 
We are now close, but this won’t quite do either. Not all reasons for believing something 
are very accessible. Some memories, for instance, cannot be accessed without significant 
effort on the agent’s behalf, and so an agent can only rarely consult them when doing so 
makes an epistemic difference. (Ray* is a case in point.) But such memories may 
nevertheless count as among the agent’s reasons for believing something. Or perhaps we 
find it to be stretching the notion of having reasons to say that barely accessible 
memories count among them. Whatever we say here, we seem to violate some reasonable 
intuitions about what it is to have reasons for believing something. 
To resolve this apparent dilemma we need only note that the relevant notion of 
having reasons could come in degrees. The everyday concept of possession certainly 
seems to be gradable in many cases (although perhaps the legal concept is not). For 
example, one can possess abilities to perform actions to different extents, e.g. the ability 
to run a marathon. (Professional runners possess that ability to a greater extent than the 
rest of us.) Now, if having or possessing such abilities is often a gradable notion, then we 
shouldn’t be surprised if the notion of having, or possessing, reasons is gradable as well. 
At the very least, one can easily construct a gradable notion of having reasons in a way 
analogous to the gradable notion of possessing the ability to run a marathon. And if the 
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considerations above are along the right lines, then this gradable notion must be the 
operative notion in the argument from possession. So we can now accommodate the 
worries with (2Esimple) and (2Eextra) thus: 
(2E) To the extent that S has a reason for (or against) believing some proposition p, 
this reason must be epistemically accessible to S. 
The idea is that one has epistemic reasons in so far as, or to the degree that, those reasons 
are epistemically accessible. In one extreme case, completely inaccessible reasons are not 
one’s own reasons at all. In the other extreme case, completely accessible reasons are 
completely one’s own reasons. As far as I know, there is no better way to capture the 
relevant relationship between the notions of epistemic access and having reasons. 
 We are now finally able to formulate the most accurate version of our original 
argument from possession by replacing (2) with (2E). We will of course also have to 
revise (1) and (3) to accommodate our newfound insight into the notion of having reasons 
and its relation to epistemic access. The argument now runs as follows: 
(1E) S’s justificatory status with regard to some proposition p is fully determined by 
the reasons S has for (and against) believing p, and the extent to which S has 
those reasons. 
(2E) To the extent that S has a reason for (or against) believing some proposition p, 
this reason must be epistemically accessible to S. 
(3E) Therefore, S’s justificatory status is fully determined by factors epistemically 
accessible to S, and the extent to which those factors are epistemically accessible 
to S. [Follows from (1E) and (2E).] 
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Of course, (3E) is precisely the theory formulated in the previous section, i.e. externalist 
accessibilism. 
 To sum up, the argument from possession, which is supposed to be an argument 
for internalist accessibilism, turns out to need two modifications. First, the second 
premise had to be modified to account for the fact that epistemically accessible external 
factors can count as an agent’s epistemic reasons for believing something. Second, we 
also had to modify the argument in order to account for the fact that one can have reasons 
to different degrees. With these two relatively minor modifications, the argument from 
possession turns out to support externalist accessibilism rather than any kind of 
internalism. 
 
6.3. The Argument from Belief-Regulation Revisited 
Finally, let us now revisit the third argument for internalism, the argument from belief-
regulation: 
(1) S’s justificatory status is fully determined by factors that enable S to regulate her 
beliefs. 
(2) Only factors internal to S could enable S to regulate her beliefs. 
(3) Therefore, S’s justificatory status is fully determined by factors internal to S. 
[Follows from (1) and (2).] 
As you might suspect, the vulnerable premise here is (2). In fact, I cannot even see that 
there is any prima facie case for it being true, and counterexamples are easy to find. 
Sally* constitutes one such counterexample: She can use her notebook to regulate her 
beliefs in the relevant sense, even though her notebook is clearly not internal to her. 
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 As before, however, it would be premature to conclude that the right premise to 
replace (2) with is: 
(2Esimple) Only factors epistemically accessible to S could enable S to regulate her 
beliefs. 
Again, it’s not that I think this is wrong. It is true, I think, that only factors that are 
epistemically accessible could enable one to regulate one’s beliefs. But we need a more 
informative account of what it is that determines an agent’s justificatory status – we need 
an account that differentiates between, e.g., Bob* and Ray*. So, we should replace (2) 
not with the simplistic (2Esimple), but with a premise that respects the gradability of 
epistemic access: 
(2E) Factors could enable S to regulate her beliefs only to the extent that those 
factors are epistemically accessible to S. 
(2E) asserts that there is a determination-relationship between, roughly, the extent to 
which S would (without doing any significant investigation) consult some factor F when 
doing so makes an epistemic difference, on the one hand, and the extent to which F 
enables S to regulate her beliefs, on the other. (2E) is plausible because it seems that the 
extent to which something can regulate one’s beliefs depends on the extent to which it 
would be consulted in the right situations and the extent to which this consulting 
wouldn’t require one to do any significant investigation. Otherwise put, an optimally 
belief-regulating factor would be such that one would consult it whenever it makes an 
epistemic difference, and such that one wouldn’t have to do any significant investigation 
in order to do so.35 
                                                
35 A potential problem with (2E) is that part of what determines one’s degree of epistemic access 
to some factor is whether one would consult that factor when doing so makes a difference to what 
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Making analogous modifications as we did when we revisited the argument from 
possession, the argument from belief-regulation now goes like this: 
(1E) S’s justificatory status is fully determined by factors that enable S to regulate her 
beliefs and the extent to which those factors enable S to regulate her beliefs. 
(2E) Factors could enable S to regulate her beliefs only to the extent that those factors 
are epistemically accessible to S. 
(3E) Therefore, S’s justificatory status is fully determined by factors that are 
epistemically accessible to S and the extent to which those factors are 
epistemically accessible to S. [Follows from (1E) and (2E).] 
Again, (3E) is simply externalist accessibilism. So, if the argument from belief-regulation 
is distinct from the argument from possession, as I am inclined to think, we have yet 
another internalist argument for externalist accessibilism. If, on the other hand, the 
argument from belief-regulation is just a version of the argument from possession, we 
have now shown that the externalist accessibilist modification of the latter is applicable 
also to the former. Either way we have further support for externalist accessibilism. 
 
Let us take stock. None of the three arguments for internalism that I discussed in section 
2 are sound, for there are clear counterexamples to the arguments’ premises. However, all 
of the arguments can be easily modified to support externalist accessibilism, the view I 
outlined in the last section. So, we began with three arguments that all seemed to support 
                                                                                                                                            
one is able to justify. Since what one is able to justify doesn’t seem to have any direct relation to 
belief-regulation, one might worry that factors can regulate to a greater or lesser extent than they 
are epistemically accessible. This, I think, just goes to show that (1) (and thus (1E) below) needs 
to be modified so as to account for the fact – for I take it to be a fact – that an agent’s justificatory 
status depends not only on what enables her to regulate her beliefs, but also on what enables her 
to justify her beliefs to others. I haven’t included this revision of (1) in the main text since it is not 
among the main points I want to make in an already too long section. 
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internalism. But when properly modified in light of counterexamples, all three arguments 
turn out not to support internalism in any form. Rather, they all support externalist 
accessibilism, an externalist theory of what determines an agent’s justificatory status. 
 
7. Replies to Objections 
I now turn to replying to anticipated objections to externalist accessibilism. I will present 
these objections in what I take to be an increasing order of importance. I do so primarily 
because some of what I have to say in reply to the first objections is relevant to what I 
have to say in reply to the last one. 
 
7.1. Two Objections from The Extended Mind Thesis 
The first type of objection I will consider was briefly mentioned in section 4, and 
concerns a particular theory of the boundaries of our minds, viz. Clark and Chalmers’s 
(1998) extended mind thesis (EMT). EMT isn’t just the more familiar view, due to 
Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979), that the content of some beliefs are determined by 
external facts. Rather, EMT holds that one’s mind can be actively extended into one’s 
environment because cognitive processes can be performed by parts of the world that are 
outside one’s head. According to Clark and Chalmers, this possibility is realized in cases 
in which 
the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating 
a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right. All the 
components in the system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern behaviour 
in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we remove the external 
component the system’s behavioural competence will drop, just as it would if we 
removed part of its brain. (1998: 8-9) 
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To illustrate their point, Clark and Chalmers use the example of Otto, an Alzheimer’s 
patient who uses a notebook to record his beliefs. This might sound quite similar to my 
case of Sally*. Of course, I haven’t said that Sally*’s beliefs are contained in her 
notebook, only that some of her justifiers are. But if EMT is correct, then one might think 
that Sally*’s justifiers are part of her beliefs, and so, in the most relevant sense, internal 
to Sally*. 
Before I discuss the objections that may be raised by this point, let me first say 
that I don’t much care whether it is indeed appropriate to say that externalist 
accessibilism is an externalist theory. If the mind extends to parts of the world outside 
our skulls, then perhaps an agent’s justificatory status is, on externalist accessibilism, 
fully determined by that agent’s mental states. If so, then externalist accessibilism would, 
in a sense, be a mentalist theory, and so, in that sense, a version of internalism. As it 
happens, I will argue that this inference fails, because some of what externalist 
accessibilism says is relevant to an agent’s justificatory status is not internal to even the 
extended mind as Clark and Chalmers understand it. But suppose it didn’t fail. If all that 
is at stake are the labels ‘externalist’ and ‘internalist’, then I wouldn’t mind if EMT 
makes externalist accessibilism into an internalist theory. (Of course, in that case it might 
be slightly awkward to call the view ‘externalist accessibilism’ (as opposed to, say, 
‘outside-skull accessibilism’). But since the extended mind thesis is at least not a standard 
assumption in epistemology, I shall continue to use this label for the view advanced in 
this paper.) 
So something more than just labels must be at stake here. What could that be? 
There are two ways that I can see in which EMT could cause trouble for the view of 
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justification I am proposing here, externalist accessibilism. First, one could argue that 
given EMT, externalist accessibilism and some form of internalism amount to the same 
theory. And so, the objection would go, externalist accessibilism would not be a very 
interesting thesis, just a consequence of two separate philosophical views, both of which 
are well-known already. The second way EMT might cause trouble is if externalist 
accessibilism was somehow held hostage to the truth or plausibility of EMT. The idea 
would be that EMT is the sole or main motivation for externalist accessibilism, and so the 
plausibility of the latter would depend on the plausibility of the former. Note that these 
two objections are quite different, for the first one depends on the truth or plausibility of 
the extended mind thesis while the second does not. Nevertheless, I will argue that both 
objections fail for a number of different reasons. Let us consider the two objections in 
turn. 
Consider first the objection that externalist accessibilism collapses into a familiar 
kind of internalism if EMT is true. This objection fails for at least two distinct reasons. 
First, it is simply false that externalist accessibilism would be an internalist theory, given 
EMT. And, second, even if externalist accessibilism would be an internalist theory, given 
EMT, it would not be a familiar internalist theory. Rather, externalist accessibilism 
would be a distinct and importantly different internalist theory. Let us go through these 
two replies in turn. 
To see first why externalist accessibilism wouldn’t be an internalist theory if EMT 
is true, we must look into the details of EMT. When discussing why EMT says that 
Otto’s notebook counts as Otto’s memory, Clark and Chalmers list a number of features 
which they think “play a crucial role”. One is that “upon retrieving information from the 
 63 
notebook [Otto] automatically endorses it”. Another feature is that “the information in the 
notebook has been consciously endorsed at some point in the past, and indeed is there as 
a consequence of this endorsement.” (1998: 17) Although Clark and Chalmers think that 
it is arguable whether this latter feature is absolutely necessary for the notebook to count 
as Otto’s memory, they do seem to think that the feature is at least typical of someone’s 
memory. Indeed, it seems clear that the first feature isn’t absolutely necessary either, 
since one could certainly fail to automatically endorse what one’s own memory suggests. 
So I take Clark and Chalmers to be claiming rather that these two features, and a couple 
others which I will not discuss here, determine the extent to which something counts as 
one’s memory. In sum, then, these features may not be necessary for something to count 
as one’s memory, but they are, as Clark and Chalmers put it, crucial. 
But now note that I did not specify Sally*’s notebook so as to have either of these 
two features. Indeed, I explicitly said that Sally* does not necessarily automatically 
endorse the information in the notebook relevant to Obama’s victory. Sally*, I said, could 
be quite skeptical towards her notebook. Moreover, Sally* need not have written the 
notes in her notebook herself. More generally, Sally* need not have previously endorsed 
the information in her notebook. Nothing about the use I have made of Sally*’s case 
depends on anything of that sort. So let us suppose now that Sally wouldn’t automatically 
endorse the information in her notebook and that she hasn’t endorsed it in the past. Then, 
since Sally*’s notebook completely lacks the two crucial features discussed above, Clark 
and Chalmers’s EMT seems to entail that Sally*’s notebook is not her memory (at least 
not to any significant extent). Thus, it seems that Sally*’s notebook would not be part of 
her extended mind on EMT. But externalist accessibilism still says that the notes are 
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relevant to Sally*’s justificatory status. And, importantly, the extent to which the notes 
are relevant is completely independent, on externalist accessibilism, of whether Sally* 
has the two features discussed above – these two features are not in any way crucial to 
Sally*’s notebook being relevant for justification, according to externalist accessibilism. 
Hence, even if ‘external’ means ‘external to the extended mind’, externalist accessibilism 
would still be a theory according to which justifiers can be external. Thus, it would not be 
an internalist theory. 
The second reason the objection we are now considering fails is that even if EMT 
made externalist accessibilism (EA)36 into an internalist theory, EA would not be a 
familiar form of internalism. EA would be a distinct internalist theory of what 
justification supervenes on. To see why, note that internalists can respond in one of two 
ways to EMT. First, they could respond by restricting their internalism to states of the 
unextended mind, i.e. roughly to that part of the extended mind which happens to be 
inside our heads. To see why it’s reasonable to expect this, note that not doing so risks 
reducing internalism to a quite uninformative theory according to which anything at all in 
an agent’s extended mind could be relevant to justification. The problem is not, of course, 
that this makes internalism false, but that it makes internalism uninformative. And so 
even if EMT is true, then it is reasonable to expect that internalists would restrict their 
proposed supervenience base to what is inside our heads, or something in that vicinity, in 
order to make their theory more informative. If so, then EA would still differ from 
internalism in virtue of not restricting the supervenience base of justification to what is 
inside our heads. So, in that case, EA would clearly not collapse into any familiar 
                                                
36 In the next few paragraphs, I will, for brevity, use the acronym ‘EA’ instead of ‘externalist 
accessibilism’. 
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internalist theory, even on the assumption that EA would count as an internalist theory if 
EMT is true. 
But suppose internalists didn’t respond in this way to EMT. Suppose, rather, that 
they maintained that internalism restricts justifiers only to factors in the extended mind. 
This still wouldn’t make EA into a familiar form of internalism, even if EMT made EA 
into an internalist theory. For EA simply wouldn’t say that everything in an agent’s 
extended mind, if there is such a thing, is relevant to justification. Rather, EA would say 
that only some of the things in the extended mind are relevant, viz. factors to which we 
have epistemic access. So, if internalism is mentalism, i.e. the view that only mental 
states are relevant to justification, then that’s a different theory than EA even on the 
assumption that mentalists would hold that even external mental states could be relevant 
to justification. The two theories would differ with regard to whether those mental states 
of the extended mind which are not epistemically accessible can be relevant to 
justification. EA says ‘no’, whereas mentalism would be silent. So too if internalism is 
internalist accessibilism. Then EA differs from internalism with regard to whether some 
of the internally accessible factors which are not also epistemically accessible can be 
relevant to justification. Again, EA says ‘no’, whereas internalist accessibilism would be 
silent. In either case, EA does not collapse into any of the two forms of internalism we 
have discussed so far. So, unless there is some familiar form of internalism I do not know 
about, EMT would not make EA into a familiar internalist theory, even if internalism 
held only that all justifiers are internal to the extended mind and EMT made EA into an 
internalist theory. 
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I have argued that EA does not in fact collapse into any common form of 
internalism on EMT, even if EMT made EA into an internalist theory, because EA would 
not be extensionally equivalent to any familiar form of internalism. There is a slightly 
deeper point in the vicinity: Unlike internalism, EA is not a theory that says that only a 
certain non-epistemically delineated set of factors is relevant to justification. This 
fundamental difference between EA and internalism would not go away even if, 
counterfactually, these theories would be extensionally equivalent on a liberal theory of 
the mind like EMT. Differently put, if an internalist came along and, with an appropriate 
theory of the boundaries of the mind, gave us the exact same results as EA about which 
factors are relevant to justification, then I would still object – and I think you should too – 
that this conjunction of theories gets the right results for the wrong reasons. Such a 
theory, I would argue, would still be fundamentally mistaken about what makes 
something relevant for justification. What makes something relevant to justification is not 
whether something is inside or outside our minds, on any theory of what counts as part of 
our minds. Rather, what makes something relevant to justification depends on whether it 
has the epistemic property of being epistemically accessible by the agent in question – 
and whether or not something has that epistemic property is at best only accidentally 
related to whether it happens to be located inside or outside the agent’s mind. 
 To sum up, my response to the first objection from EMT is twofold: First I argued 
that EMT does not make externalist accessibilism into an internalist theory because some 
factors external to even the extended mind would be relevant to justification on 
externalist accessibilism. I then argued that even if EMT made externalist accessibilism 
into an internalist theory, externalist accessibilism would still be different from any 
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familiar form of internalism. This is because internalists must either (a) restrict the 
supervenience base of justification to that which is internal to the unextended mind, in 
which case externalist accessibilism clearly differs extensionally from internalism, or (b) 
restrict the supervenience base of justification only to the extended mind, in which case 
there would be factors in that extended mind which externalist accessibilism says are 
irrelevant to justification but about which both forms of internalism are silent. Either 
way, externalist accessibilism would not collapse into a familiar form of internalism. For 
these two reasons, I conclude that the first objection from EMT fails. 
Let us move on to the second objection, i.e. the objection that externalist 
accessibilism is somehow held hostage to EMT. The way I think of this objection, it goes 
something like this: ‘You claimed that Sally* is more justified than Mary*. But that is 
only plausible in so far as we are assuming that Sally*’s and Mary*’s notebooks are in 
fact their memories or parts of their memories. And that is in turn only plausible in so far 
as we are assuming that EMT is true. So the claim that Sally* is more justified than 
Mary* is only plausible in so far as we are assuming that EMT is true.’ If this objection 
went through, then I admit that externalist accessibilism would indeed be held hostage to 
the plausibility of EMT. That would be especially worrisome if we had independent 
reasons to think that EMT is false. But I will argue that the objection does not go through, 
so we don’t have to worry about whether EMT is false. 
 So what’s wrong with the objection? Three things. First, the objection assumes 
that I rested my case for Sally* being more justified than Mary* on something like an 
intuitive judgment about the case. I did not. Rather, I argued (in section 4) that restricting 
justifiers to internal factors involves discriminating between factors that are epistemically 
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on a par. In particular, although I do think it is intuitive to say that Sally* is more justified 
than Mary*, I did not appeal to this intuition in my argument. Instead, I argued that the 
contrast between Sally* and Mary* was epistemically just like the contrast between Sally 
and Mary, and since it is clearly the case that Sally is more justified than Mary, Sally* 
must also be more justified than Mary*. I also argued that Sally*, unlike Mary*, was 
justified to some degree because she could justify the relevant proposition to others 
quickly and reliably in various circumstances. Neither argument depends on an intuitive 
judgment about the justificatory statuses of Sally* and Mary*. As a consequence, the 
arguments do not depend on how plausible it is that Sally*’s and Mary*’s notebooks are 
their memories. And so the arguments do not depend on a theory of the mind according 
to which this would be so. 
 The second thing wrong with the objection is that even if I had rested my 
argument against internalism on the intuition that Sally* is more justified than Mary*, 
that still need not presuppose EMT. Just think about it: Assume the mind isn’t extended 
at all – that our minds are completely contained within our heads. In particular, imagine 
that Sally*’s and Mary*’s notebooks are not their memories or part of their memories. 
Does this make any difference to your intuition – if you had that intuition – that Sally* is 
more justified than Mary*, given of course that Sally* has epistemic access to the 
relevant notes and that Mary* does not? If you are anything like me, it doesn’t. Again, I 
want to emphasize that I didn’t rest my case for externalist accessibilism on intuitions 
like these at all. My point here is only that EMT is completely irrelevant even to this 
intuition-based argument for externalist accessibilism. 
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The third and final thing wrong with the objection is that it is simply false that 
EMT makes Sally*’s notebook into her memory. We have seen why already: The 
notebook need not be such that Sally* automatically endorses what it says. Moreover, 
Sally* need not have endorsed the notes in the notebook at any previous time. But these 
are crucial features, according to Clark and Chalmers’s EMT, for Sally*’s notebook to 
count as her memory. Therefore, the claim that Sally*’s notebook would be her memory 
on EMT is simply false, and so an argument from EMT to Sally* being more justified 
than Mary* fails. It is thus hard to see in what way the plausibility of the claim that 
Sally* is more justified than Mary* could depend on EMT. 
To sum up, the second objection from EMT fails for three reasons. First, the 
objection assumes that I rested my case for Sally* being more justified than Mary* on an 
intuitive judgment about their relative justificatory statuses. I did not. Second, even if my 
case had rested on such an intuitive judgment, that intuitive judgment appears to be 
completely independent of whether EMT is true or false. And third, since EMT does not 
entail that Sally*’s and Mary*’s notebooks are their memories, there is no route from 
EMT to Sally* being more justified than Mary*. I conclude that the case for externalist 
accessibilism does not depend on EMT in any way, and so that the second objection from 
EMT fails. 
 
7.2. The Relevance of Non-Actual Circumstances 
Recall that I said, roughly, that the degree of epistemic access an agent S has to some 
factor F is a function of, among other things, the salient possible circumstances in which 
S would consult F when doing so makes an epistemic difference. I went on to claim that 
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an agent’s justificatory status supervened on this degree of epistemic access. To this 
someone might object: ‘If an agent S would (successfully) consult a factor F in S’s 
current circumstances C, is that not enough for F to be as relevant as possible to S’s 
justificatory status in circumstances C, at least if consulting F does not require S to do 
any significant investigation? Otherwise put, why would S’s degree of justification in C 
depend on circumstances other than the actual circumstances that S is in, viz. C?’ 
 To see why this objection does not work, we must first recall the distinction 
between doxastic and propositional justification. Externalist accessibilism, as I have 
characterized it, is a theory about propositional justification, not about doxastic 
justification. So it’s a theory about what is relevant to an agent possessing or having 
available justification for some belief. Now consider what it is for something to be 
available to you. It is not, at least not ordinarily, just for that something to be present at a 
particular time. Rather, I think, it is for it to be present roughly when you might have to 
make use of it, or when you might need it. So, more precisely, I don’t think that what it is 
to have something available at a time t only involves it being present to you in the right 
sort of way at t. Rather, to have something available at t, it seems to me, essentially 
involves that it is likely to also be present in the right sort of way at times later than t and 
in circumstances other than the actual circumstances. In short, I think we can say – very 
roughly, of course – that to have something available at a particular time t is, in the sense 
relevant to us here, for that thing to be present in the right way in the maximum number 
of salient circumstances, actual and possible. So, in particular, to have available some 
justification is not just for that justification to be present to you in the actual 
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circumstances you are in. It is also for that justification to be present to you in other 
salient circumstances which may never be realized. 
Now, if all this is right, then it shouldn’t be surprising that, as I claim, 
propositional justification isn’t just a matter of being disposed to consult some factors in 
the actual circumstances one happens to find oneself in at a particular time. Rather, we 
should expect for propositional justification to depend also on merely possible 
circumstances, given that those circumstances are salient to us. In particular, then, there is 
nothing objectionable about the externalist accessibilist claim that propositional 
justification is a matter of being disposed to (successfully) consult certain factors in a 
range of salient possible circumstances in which consulting those factors makes an 
epistemic difference. 
To sum up, the objection considered above states that non-actual possible 
circumstances cannot be relevant to whether an agent is justified in the actual 
circumstances she is in. This, I argued, is not so, because to be propositionally justified 
isn’t just a matter of a justifier being present in the right sort of way in the actual 
circumstances. It is, rather, like any other availability, a matter of the justifier also being 
present in salient possible circumstances, some of which may never be actual. As a 
consequence, there is nothing objectionable about epistemic access, and thus an agent’s 
justificatory status, depending on non-actual circumstances as well as the circumstances 
an agent is currently in. 
Ultimately, though, the adequacy of epistemic accessibilism does not depend on 
whether it fits well with an analysis of what it is to have (propositional) justification. 
Rather, the ultimate test of the account consists in considering whether it results in 
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plausible judgments about agents’ justificatory statuses in ordinary cases. Unfortunately, 
there is a quite strong presumption against thinking that externalist accessibilism does 
give us plausible results for many ordinary cases. That is the most serious objection to 
externalist accessibilism, and it is to that objection I now turn. 
 
7.3. Is Epistemic Access Too Easy to Get? 
It is undeniable, I think, that most of our most powerful justifiers are internal to our 
minds. Consider memories, for instance. Memories are present in most, if not all, salient 
possible circumstances in which consulting them would make an epistemic difference, 
and consulting them requires almost no investigation at all. As a consequence, the degree 
of epistemic access we have to our memories is, in normal cases, extremely high. 
However, although memories are thus special, they are only special in virtue of being 
much more epistemically accessible in normal cases than many other factors, e.g. notes in 
notebooks. In other words, my claim is that, normally, memories are relevant to 
justification only to a greater degree than, say, notes in notebooks. More generally, 
although internal factors are typically much more accessible than external factors, and so 
typically contribute much more to an agent’s positive justificatory status, this difference 
is one of degree, on my view, and not one of kind. 
 According to the objection I now want to consider, this makes justification too 
easy. We do not have justification, the objection goes, for believing anything merely in 
virtue of having epistemic access to something. There are endless ways of making this 
objection more precise by discussing specific examples. For brevity, I will consider only 
two such examples. One example, due originally to Goldman (1999), concerns a train 
 73 
passenger’s epistemic access to a neighboring landscape that he hasn’t yet perceived. The 
other concerns epistemic access to information on the Internet. In what follows, I will use 
these two cases to make some important points instead of going through them 
systematically. Indeed, my conclusion will not only be that these two examples are not 
counterexamples to externalist accessibilism, but that this general line of objecting to 
externalist accessibilism fails. So, my reply here, if successful, should provide us with a 
recipe for dealing with any proposed counterexamples of this kind. 
 Before we look at these examples, I want to emphasize that responding to such 
attempted counterexamples is really a completely unnecessary task for an externalist 
accessibilist. This is so for the simple reason that externalist accessibilism is not the 
thesis that everything to which an agent has epistemic access is relevant to that agent’s 
justificatory status. It is rather the thesis that everything relevant to an agent’s 
justificatory status is epistemically accessible. This should have been clear from the 
outset, since internalists similarly claim that everything relevant to an agent’s 
justificatory status is internal, not that everything internal is relevant. Moreover, it seems 
inevitable that an adequate theory of what kinds of factors could contribute to 
justification will include among those factors some factors that are not in fact relevant. 
But this is no threat to the truth of such theories, of course, because they are 
supervenience theses which claim not that everything in the supervenience base is 
relevant to an agent’s justificatory status, but that everything relevant is in the 
supervenience base. 
Now, I have tried to give you a more informative story of what is relevant to 
justification. I have tried not only to say which kinds of factors could be relevant to 
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justification, i.e. what the supervenience base of justification is, but also how relevant the 
relevant factors are to an agent’s justificatory status. That’s what I’ve done, but I didn’t 
really have to. I could just have said, along with my opponents the internalists, that I’m 
merely presenting some necessary conditions for something to count as a justifier. Had I 
done that, I would merely have said that a necessary condition for something to be a 
justifier is for the agent to have some degree of epistemic access to that factor. Had I said 
just that, then the kind of objections I’m now considering would be completely 
ineffective: The putative counterexamples would not show that having some degree of 
epistemic access to a factor isn’t a necessary condition for that factor to be a justifier, 
only that it’s not also a sufficient condition. But I have claimed no such thing, I would 
say. It’s a different question, I would continue, to ask what it is that makes the Internet 
irrelevant to an agent’s justificatory status (or at least less relevant than, say, Sally*’s 
notebook and Sally’s memories). That’s a question externalist accessibilism just does not 
answer. So, even if the objector is right that things like unperceived neighboring 
landscapes and information on the Internet are irrelevant to justification, externalist 
accessibilism would still stand unrefuted. 
 This may sound like cheating, and there may be something to that charge. But 
note now that this is no more cheating that internalists are themselves guilty of. Most 
obviously, an amazing number of mental states are completely irrelevant to justification. 
Emotions, for example, do not seem relevant to the justification of any beliefs, except 
through beliefs that we might happen to have about those emotions. That is to say: 
Emotions are irrelevant in the same way that perceivable objects are irrelevant – they are 
only relevant in so far as we have some beliefs or other propositional attitudes about 
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them. Accordingly, mentalists claim only that anything that is relevant to justification is a 
mental state, not that all mental states are relevant. Also obviously, internalist 
accessibilists cannot claim that everything that is cognitively accessible, or accessible by 
reflection alone, is relevant to justification. For surely some things that are cognitively 
accessible, e.g. dreams and made-up stories, are irrelevant to an agent’s justification.37 In 
sum, internalists of both stripes seem to be guilty of the same kind of cheating as I would 
be, were I to respond to the current objection in this way. I, like them, would only be 
claiming to have identified a necessary condition for something to count as a justifier. 
Cheating or not, my theory would at least have the advantage of being true. 
 This, however, isn’t my preferred response to these counterexamples. I prefer to 
meet them head on and argue that the objectors are wrong about these factors not 
contributing to an agent’s justificatory status. Let us thus at last look more closely at the 
alleged counterexamples. Consider first Goldman’s case. In responding to Feldman’s 
(1988) suggestion that one can be dispositionally justified in believing a proposition p if 
one has a disposition to be justified in believing p, Goldman seems to give an argument 
against something very much like externalist accessibilism. Goldman writes: 
Suppose a train passenger awakes from a nap but has not yet opened his eyes. Is he 
justified in believing propositions about the details of the neighboring landscape? 
Surely not. Yet he is disposed, merely by opening his eyes, to generate conscious 
evidential states that would occurrently justify such beliefs. (1999: 278-9) 
 
We need to fill in the relevant details of this case to see whether it constitutes a 
counterexample to externalist accessibilism. 
 The train passenger, let us say, would, by opening his eyes and looking out of the 
window, consult the neighboring landscape in order to determine whether he should 
                                                
37 Admittedly, there is a staggering difference in degree between mentalism and accessibilism in 
this respect. 
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believe something about that landscape. So, on externalist accessibilism, the train 
passenger has some epistemic access to the neighboring landscape. But now consider the 
degree of epistemic access the train passenger has to the neighboring landscape. Recall 
that the degree of access is a function of how many and how salient the circumstances are 
in which the train passenger would consult the neighboring landscape and of how much 
investigation this requires of him. Since the train is presumably moving, there are almost 
no salient circumstances at all, except for the circumstances which happen to be actual at 
a particular moment, in which the train passenger could consult what is now outside the 
window.38 Making the train stationary wouldn’t change this very much at all. There 
would still be almost no circumstances apart from the actual ones in which the train 
passenger would, because he could, consult the neighboring landscape of the train he 
happens to be sitting in right now. Moreover, the train passenger would have to do a 
comparatively significant investigation in order to consult the neighboring landscape – it 
would certainly require more time, effort and consulting that recalling something from 
memory. In sum, then, the explanation of why it seems irrelevant to the train passenger’s 
justification what he would see if he were to open his eyes is simply that the train 
passenger has almost no epistemic access at all to the neighboring landscape. Thus, 
externalist accessibilism holds that the train passenger has almost no justification at all 
for propositions about the details of the neighboring landscape. 
                                                
38 Note that the issue concerns the train passenger’s justification for a belief about what is outside 
the window at this particular moment, not what is outside the window generally or in most cases. 
This is the issue because, as Goldman describes the case, it concerns the train passenger’s 
justification for propositions about the details of neighboring landscapes. A different kind of case 
would be one in which some parts of the neighboring landscape are held fixed as the train is 
moving, and the issue would be whether the train passenger has justification for propositions 
concerning the fixed parts of the neighboring landscapes. That kind of case resembles the 
stationary train passenger case, discussed immediately below. 
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You might object now that the train passenger’s disposition to perceive the 
neighboring landscape is completely irrelevant to his justificatory status, not just, as 
externalist accessibilism says, almost completely irrelevant. I don’t think that’s true. 
Consider a related train passenger case. Suppose another train passenger is waking up in 
another part of the train. While this train passenger was sleeping, the windows of this part 
of the train were carefully and silently closed so that this second train passenger has no 
chance of seeing what is outside the window when he opens his eyes. Is there any 
difference in the justificatory statuses of the two train passengers? It seems to me that 
there is, and that this difference is precisely due to the fact that only the first train 
passenger would be able to consult the neighboring landscape without doing any 
significant investigation in some salient circumstances, e.g. the actual circumstances, 
whereas the second train passenger cannot do so in any salient circumstances. To be 
perfectly clear, I think that there is an (admittedly small) difference in the two train 
passengers justificatory statuses even before either of them has attempted to look out of 
the window. As a consequence, I do think that the first train passenger has some degree of 
justification, albeit very small, for believing that the neighboring landscape is as it will 
appear to him if he were to look out of the window. If this looks like a bullet to you, then 
it’s a bullet I’m happy to bite.39 
 There is another important point that should be made about this case. As I’ve 
mentioned, externalist accessibilism is a theory about propositional justification, i.e. 
about what it takes to have justification for beliefs. It is not a theory about doxastic 
justification, i.e. about what it takes to have justified beliefs. The first train passenger, on 
                                                
39 Indeed I am so happy to bite it that I’ll bite it even though I have at least two ways of avoiding 
doing so. The first of these ways has already been mentioned. The other way is outlined below. 
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externalist accessibilism, would never have a justified belief about the neighboring 
landscape just in virtue of sitting on the train. In order to have a justified belief, the train 
passenger would at least have to look outside and then form a belief on the basis of what 
he sees. This is because one necessary condition for being doxastically justified is for 
one’s belief to be based on the justification one has, and the train passenger cannot base 
his belief on something he has never experienced. In sum, then, externalist accessibilism 
can account for the unreasonableness of forming beliefs about one’s neighboring 
landscape without looking at that landscape. Externalist accessibilism says only that the 
train passenger’s epistemic access to the neighboring landscape is somewhat relevant to 
his propositional justification – to the justification he has. 
 Next consider an Internet user’s epistemic access to all sorts of information on the 
Internet. Suppose that the Internet user is the sort of person who would consult the 
Internet when doing so makes a difference to what she believes and is able to justify. And 
suppose that this Internet user is right now sitting in front of a computer with a good 
Internet connection. As we have stipulated the case, the Internet user both could and 
would consult the Internet in some salient situations in which doing so makes an 
epistemic difference, so she does have some epistemic access to the relevant information 
on the Internet. But now consider the degree of access she has to that information. She 
may be able to look something up on the Internet right now, but in countless salient 
circumstances she is not so able to look it up. More importantly, looking something up on 
the Internet certainly requires significant investigation. It may not require very much 
effort for a skilled Internet user to look things up, but it certainly requires significant time 
and consultation of a lot of factors other than the information that she is looking for. The 
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Internet user thus fails to have any significant degree of epistemic access to information 
on the Internet. 
 As in the train passenger case, however, externalist accessibilism does say that the 
Internet user has some epistemic access to the Internet. Of course, the Internet user’s 
epistemic access is nowhere close to being of the same degree as the epistemic access I 
have to my memory or the epistemic access Sally* has to her notebook. But you might 
think that even a little access is bad enough – that information on the Internet is 
completely irrelevant to the extent to which one is justified in believing something. I 
don’t think that is true, and I suspect that you don’t really think so either. To see why, we 
just need some science fiction. Imagine that the Internet user manages to install a small 
computer with an Internet connection into her glasses, and so is able to look up various 
things on the Internet almost instantaneously whenever she wants to. Is the Internet now 
completely irrelevant to her justificatory status? I don’t think so, and I suspect you don’t 
either. So, in virtue of what is it relevant? Is it not relevant in virtue of the Internet user 
being able to consult the information on the Internet through her glasses in many salient 
circumstances in which doing so makes an epistemic difference? That, at any rate, is my 
hypothesis. If my hypothesis is in the vicinity of the right one, then information on the 
Internet can be relevant to someone’s justification. Thus it shouldn’t be surprising that the 
Internet is also somewhat relevant – if only a little – to the justification possessed by the 
present-day Internet user. 
 In dealing with the two cases above I have used two versions of a common 
strategy. The strategy, for any proposed counterexample, is to either increase or decrease 
the degree of epistemic access in question so as to determine whether what is driving the 
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intuition that the agent isn’t justified at all in these cases is really that the factors in 
question are not relevant at all, or whether what’s really driving the intuition is that the 
degree of epistemic access is simply much less than in any normal case in which we 
would say that an agent is justified, which in turn results in a much lesser degree of 
justification than in any such normal case. The first train passenger, if I’m right, did have 
some degree of justification over the second train passenger, due to the fact that he had a 
slightly greater degree of epistemic access to the neighboring landscape. The first Internet 
user, by contrast, had a lesser degree of justification than the second Internet user, due to 
the fact that the second had more epistemic access to information on the Internet. If all 
this is right, then a general strategy for dealing with proposed counterexamples like those 
above is to compare the proposed counterexample with another example in which a 
similar agent has either somewhat more or somewhat less epistemic access to the relevant 
factor. If there seems to be a justificatory difference between the two cases, then the 
factor in question cannot be completely irrelevant to an agent’s justificatory status. 
 Now, of course, I haven’t at all tried to estimate how much a lesser degree of 
epistemic access diminishes the extent to which the accessible factor contributes to an 
agent’s justification. I suspect it happens pretty quickly, so that factors to which we have 
even quite a lot of epistemic access do not contribute very much at all to justification. 
However, I don’t think there is any cut-off point at which a particular low but non-zero 
degree of epistemic access makes the accessible factor not at all relevant to justification. 
But that’s just me. If you prefer to postulate such a cut-off point so that our epistemic 
access to neighboring landscapes and to information on the internet are, at least generally, 
completely irrelevant to justification, then I would not complain very much. Of course, if 
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you set the bar high enough then perhaps external factors are almost never relevant to 
justification, since our best epistemic access is normally to internal factors. But as long as 
you respect our case of Sally* and Mary*, as I have argued that you should, then you 
cannot set it so high that only internal factors become relevant to justification. So, 
externalist accessibilism would still remain an externalist theory no matter whether you 
think that there is such a cut-off point.40 
Although I am not myself very sympathetic to this move, it is worth noting that it 
does seem to be able to deal both of the proposed counterexamples. Neither the train 
passenger nor the Internet user seems to have the sufficient degree of access to be above 
any plausible cut-off point for being justified to any degree by the accessible factor. This 
still wouldn’t rule out Sally*’s notebook from being relevant to her justificatory status, 
since her degree of epistemic access to the notebook is much greater. So, for someone 
who is so far unconvinced by my ways of dealing with these counterexamples, but still 
finds externalist accessibilism attractive, postulating a cut-off point might be the way to 
go. It is, at any rate, a third way to deal with the proposed counterexamples. 
 To sum up, there are at least three ways for externalist accessibilism to deal with 
the line of objection we are now considering: First, the way I prefer, to argue that the 
train passenger and the Internet user, due to their very low degree of epistemic access, 
have only a minute degree of justification for the relevant propositions. This way has the 
advantage of explaining how even agents with very little epistemic access to some factor 
can differ justificationally. I consider that to be a virtue of this response, but you may 
disagree. The second way, the way I just laid out, postulates a cut-off point for epistemic 
                                                
40 Unless, of course, the extended mind thesis is true. For discussion about that possibility, see the 
first part of this section. 
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access, and so avoids any obvious counterexamples. But it does so at the cost of having to 
explain why low degrees of epistemic access would be completely irrelevant to an 
agent’s justificatory status. The third way, discussed first, depends crucially on granting 
that not everything externally accessible is relevant to justification. This response is 
unfortunately silent about why some epistemically accessible factors and not others are 
relevant to justification. But that doesn’t make it false, any more than internalism is made 
false by the fact that some internal factors are irrelevant to justification. Although I prefer 
the first of these responses, for the above reasons, I cannot see that there are any 
insurmountable problems with either of the other two responses. If all this is right, then 
externalist accessibilism has surprisingly rich resources for dealing with the line of 
objection that seems most threatening to it. I conclude that we have good reasons to think 
that externalist accessibilism would be able to deal with any proposed counterexample of 
the kind discussed here. 
 
To conclude this final section, I have argued that none of the three kinds of objections to 
externalist accessibilism are effective. First of all, externalist accessibilism does not 
collapse into any familiar kind of internalism, if the extended mind thesis (EMT) is true, 
nor does the case for externalist accessibilism depend on EMT. Second, there is nothing 
objectionable about externalist accessibilism holding that degrees of epistemic access, 
and thus justificatory statuses, depend on non-actual circumstances. Third, and finally, 
externalist accessibilism is able to deal with two counterexamples which purported to 
show that externalist accessibilism made justification to easy to get. Moreover, we saw 
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that externalist accessibilism seems well equipped to deal with any proposed 
counterexamples of the same kind. 
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